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The Individual Mandate’s Due Process Legality:
A Kantian Explanation, and Why It Matters
Peter Brandon Bayer*
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, one of
the most controversial decisions of this young century, an intensely
divided Supreme Court upheld the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act’s most provocative feature—the Individual Mandate—under
Congress’s taxing power. In so doing, the Court rejected what
appeared to be the Individual Mandate’s more applicable constitutional
premise—Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. Yet,
neither the Constitution’s Taxing Clause nor its Commerce Clause
provide the ultimate answer as to whether Congress may regulate the
multi-billion dollar healthcare market by compelling unwilling persons
to buy private health insurance. The final determination of the
Individual Mandate’s constitutionality lies within the profound and
pivotal tenets of liberty secured by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Indeed, the prime criticism against the Individual Mandate is that
Government exceeds its legitimate authority—i.e., infringes liberty—
when it compels individuals to purchase unwanted products, even for
the greater public good. As the popular cliché goes, if today Congress
can make us buy health insurance, tomorrow it could be cars or
broccoli. This Article argues that, to the contrary, the Individual
Mandate fully comports with vital liberty interests without opening a
“floodgate” whereby Congress can force persons to buy any commodity
to promote any purported societal benefit.
Specifically, due process protects the innate dignity of every person
from even well-meaning impositions by any level of government. In this
crucial regard, although courts do not so acknowledge, modern due
process jurisprudence has intuited and applied the “metaphysics of
morals” espoused by the highly respected Enlightenment philosopher
Immanuel Kant. Kantian morality explains modern substantive and
* William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I thank the friends and
colleagues with whom I have discussed this work, in particular Professors Ian Bartrum, George
Mader, Tom McAffee, Ann McGinley, and my research assistant Erica Okerberg.
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procedural due process of law.
Among his essential tenets, Kant famously argued that although there
is no general duty to aid the poor, Government cannot enact laws that
create supplicants; that is, persons who, due to dependence on charity
for minimal sustenance, become virtual slaves. When the law itself
causes poverty, Government, as the author of that law, has an absolute
duty to restore the poor from quasi-slavery to independence. Kant
sensibly suggested a tax for the benefit of the indigent, enabling them to
regain liberty sufficient to stop begging.
The Individual Mandate is the very type of tax that Kant anticipated
to prevent individuals from becoming vagabonds—effectively slaves—
pleading for the vital healthcare that they cannot afford but eventually
will need. Thus, the Individual Mandate comports with liberty as
vouchsafed by due process. Moreover, Congress cannot exercise such
power merely to safeguard even significant commercial markets
because unlike acquiring health insurance, consumers who now refuse
to buy cars and broccoli will not suddenly need these products to
survive but be unable to purchase them absent insurance.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION: HOW KANTIAN ETHICS ELUCIDATES THE TRUE
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE ................. 867
I. A TERSE PRÉCIS OF COMMERCE’S LINK WITH LIBERTY .................. 871
A. Today’s Constitutional Benchmark: The “Economic
Effects” Standard .................................................................... 872
B. The Four Judicial Phases of Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence........................................................................... 875
C. Commerce, Federalism, and Individual Liberty...................... 879
D. Why the Individual Mandate Comports with Congress’s
Power to Tax, but Not Its Power to Regulate Commerce ....... 884
II. THE KANTIAN DEFENSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE ................. 887
A. Moral Theory Is Deontological, Not
Utilitarian/Consequentialist..................................................... 888
B. Professor Barnett’s Quasi-Deontology.................................... 892
C. Dignity, Morality, Duty, and the Necessity to Form
Societies under Due Process of Law ....................................... 896
1. The Rational Capacity of Each Person to Discern a
“Metaphysics of Morals” .................................................... 897
2. Kant’s Dignity Principle ..................................................... 899
3. The Categorical Imperative Formulations One and Two ... 900

7_BAYER

2013]

3/9/2013 1:37 PM

The Individual Mandate’s Due Process Legality

867

4. The Categorical Imperative’s Third Formulation: The
“Kingdom of Ends” ............................................................ 903
D. Perfect and Imperfect Duties ................................................... 907
E. The Guarantee of Due Process is the Constitution’s
“Perfect Duty”: Protecting the Innate Dignity of All
Persons Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States ......... 909
III. GOVERNMENT’S DUTY TO AID THE DESTITUTE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE........................................ 912
A. Property Law and the Enslavement of Poverty ....................... 913
B. Government’s Perfect Duty to Tax for the Benefit of the
Destitute .................................................................................. 915
C. The Due Process Legitimacy of the Individual Mandate ........ 917
CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 922
INTRODUCTION: HOW KANTIAN ETHICS ELUCIDATES THE TRUE
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
Ironically, neither the Constitution’s Commerce Clause 1 nor its
Taxing and Spending Clause 2 provides the ultimate answer as to
whether Congress may regulate the multi-billion dollar healthcare
market by requiring unwilling adults to purchase private health
insurance. Although the Supreme Court recently upheld the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (“Affordable Care Act”) 3 most
provocative and crucial component, the Individual Mandate, 4 in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 5 the Supreme
Court’s final word will come if and when the Individual Mandate is
tested under the Constitution’s foremost standard: the paradigm of
liberty inspiring and impelling the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and

1. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(emphasis added).
2. Congress may “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1.
3. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “Affordable
Care Act” or “Act”].
4. See Affordable Care Act § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010).
5. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012). Specifically, the
Court found the Individual Mandate valid and enforceable pursuant to Congress’s taxing powers,
and further ruled that the Individual Mandate is not sustainable under Congress’s authority to
regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 2598–601.
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Fourteenth Amendments. 6 Indeed, unlike the Constitution’s Article I,
the predominant command of due process resolves the Individual
Mandate issue at both the federal and state levels. 7 This Article
explains why compelling unwilling persons either to purchase unwanted
health insurance or to pay a penalty does not offend core principles of
substantive due process. 8
To so demonstrate, Part I briefly explains that the prime principle
animating the commerce and tax precedents upon which Sebelius relied
is safeguarding individual liberty, something the Justices acknowledged
but did not address. Because the parties never pursued the due process
issue, 9 the Court analyzed relevant commerce and tax jurisprudence
outside of the liberty principles that vitalize those branches of American
constitutional law. Accordingly, the final chapter regarding the
Individual Mandate’s constitutionality, its due process legitimacy, waits
to be written.
After showing that commerce and tax constitutional law embraces
substantive due process, Part II explains why the Individual Mandate is
consistent with liberty. Rather than appealing to widely cited analogous
precedent, 10 this Article offers an alternative (and perhaps more
6. As four Justices correctly noted, the argument against the Individual Mandate in fact
implies a substantive due process aspect that had not been pressed except that the parties “now
concede that the provisions here at issue do not offend the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 2623
(Ginsburg, J., with Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Presumably due to the parties’ perhaps rash concession,
Sebelius did not address the due process bona fides of the Individual Mandate.
7. Pursuant to their respective texts, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause covers
federal actions, while the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause addresses state and local
regulation. Therefore, any due process review of Congress’s Individual Mandate falls under the
Fifth Amendment. However, logic dictates that “[t]he two Clauses should be applied in the same
manner when two situations present identical questions differing only in that one involves a
proscription against the federal government and the other a proscription against the States.”
Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1255 (9th Cir. 1993) (footnote omitted). After all, “there is
only one due process clause.” Id. Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (noting
that while subject to interpretive devices such as “levels of scrutiny,” there is “only one due
process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment”). Accordingly, the due process leeway, if any, of a
state to enact a local individual mandate is identical to Congress’s leeway to pass the national
Individual Mandate.
8. “It has been ‘settled’ for well over a century that the Due Process Clause[s] ‘appl[y] to
matters of substantive law as well as matters of procedure.’” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130
S. Ct. 3020, 3091 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that neither majority nor dissent addressed
the due process issue).
10. For example, Government may compel unwilling persons to be vaccinated against
communicable diseases. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (“Long before this
suit was instituted, [the Court] had settled that it is within the police power of a state to provide
for compulsory vaccination.” (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)); Workman
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compelling and convincing) approach. As I have argued elsewhere, and
to which I will refer herein, writing shortly after the American
Revolution, the well-regarded Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel
Kant offered an enthralling meta-theory of humanity predicated on a
fabric of timeless morality and immutable duty. For Kant, every person
is imbued with innate, irrevocable dignity emanating not from the acts
she actually performs, but rather from her uniquely human capacity to
understand transcendent morality and to act morally. This innate
dignity generates both a right and a duty: the right to be treated with
respect by all persons—at all times, in all places, under all
circumstances—and a corresponding duty to so treat all others.
From this “metaphysics of morals,” Kant devised his Categorical
Imperative, a set of ethical principles elucidating the nature of morality,
the structure of moral duties and the formation of liberal social orders
legitimate only if they vouchsafe the dignity of each person.
Accordingly, to borrow the terms of our Founders, individuals may
“pursue happiness,” but only while respecting the dignity of others
within a society governed by predominating moral laws that protect
“life” and “liberty.” Although they hardly ever cite Kant’s work,
American courts have discerned a jurisprudence of due process steeped
in Kantian principles of dignity and morality. Indeed, dignity—
respecting the inherent personhood of all individuals—is the
constitutional paradigm governing due process of law.
Therefore, Part III culls the intricate, compelling, and elegant
structure of Kantian morality to discern whether the Individual Mandate
unduly constricts personal liberty. Interestingly, Kant presaged our
national concern for the well-being of needy persons, arguing that while
there is no individual moral obligation to supply aid, Government 11
v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 419 F. App’x 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that parents have
no substantive due process right to refuse mandatory vaccinations prior to enrolling their children
in public or private school). Similarly, Government may quarantine persons exposed to
contagious ailments. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); United States v.
Buchard, 580 F.3d 341, 349 (6th Cir. 2009). Moreover, Government may enforce a draft (i.e.,
compulsory military conscription). See, e.g., Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918)
(“It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen
includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the
right to compel it.”). Thus, for urgent public good, Government can force medications into the
bodies of the unwilling, confine law-abiding persons to their homes or hospitals, and abrogate
individuals’ freedom to choose their own employment and residences by forcing them to engage
in military service with its attendant risk to life and limb. In contrast, paying either insurance
premiums or a tax penalty, the economic coercion of the Individual Mandate, seems a trivial
burden indeed to end the manifest injuries caused by “free riders” whose refusal or inability to
purchase insurance skews the healthcare market.
11. For purposes of this Article, and for the sake of diversity, the terms “Government” and
“State” are used interchangeably and refer generally to the panoply of legislative and executive
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itself has a mandatory duty to tax the wealthy for the benefit of the poor.
The fascinating, surprising, yet logical basis of this Kantian duty is not
that the indigent have a right to charity or that a good and generous
society is morally obliged to be charitable. Rather, poverty robs the
poor of their dignity—their ability to meaningfully pursue happiness
within a society governed by law. Because, as detailed herein, such
poverty is the byproduct of indispensable property and contract law, the
government that made those laws must restore the poor’s lost dignity,
rendering them at least minimally able to function as independent
persons. In sum, Society cannot maintain a class of supplicants, persons
in virtual slavery because they lack basic sustenance.
Like hunger, homelessness, and nakedness, the inability to afford
minimal medical care renders individuals into vagabonds, dependent on
the largesse of others. Just as Kant argued that Government assumes an
immutable moral duty to tax to help the poor, so too is there a
mandatory duty to support access to healthcare. The Individual
Mandate is such a tax. So long as it is not confiscatory or otherwise
infirm, the Individual Mandate comports with Kantian moral theory.
Because Kant’s “metaphysics of morals” is the manifest yet
unacknowledged paradigm of American due process jurisprudence, it
makes sense to consider his graceful argument that Society is dutybound to restore persons from beggars to independence. 12 Thus, there
aspects of the government.
12. As explained more thoroughly infra Parts II and III, the applicable Kantian duty is based
not only on the need to help those too poor to afford available health insurance. Other
Government programs, such as Medicaid, arguably address this social problem. Rather, the
moral justification for the Individual Mandate is premised as well on the fact that society is
riddled with persons who can afford to obtain at least minimally adequate health insurance, but
who foolishly refuse to do so. With rare exceptions, at some time in their lives, the members of
this subpopulation will suffer from a serious illness or accident requiring extensive medical
treatment that they will demand but that, due to their uninsured status, they cannot afford. Thus,
this class becomes beggars seeking whole or partial forgiveness for their unreimbursed
(seemingly avoidable) medical costs.
In addition, recent controversial but eminently correct Supreme Court decisions provide yet
another Kantian-based explanation of the Individual Mandate’s constitutional morality. For
instance, with some popular controversy, Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 130
S. Ct. 876 (2010), reaffirmed that corporations are “persons” entitled to virtually the full panoply
of individual rights under the Constitution. Absent the Individual Mandate, enforcement of the
Affordable Care Act’s other provisions likely would bankrupt the corporate entities comprising
the private healthcare industry.
Kantian morality reveals that, even for arguably beneficent reasons, Government cannot
inadvertently extinguish a class of individuals that are not causing Society harm—doing so would
defy the dignity of both the adversely affected group and the individuals that comprise the group.
Therefore, a surprising, yet plausible Kantian application of the Citizen United core principles
evinces that Congress was obligated to adopt the Individual Mandate or some other device to
assure that the Affordable Care Act will not obliterate the private health insurance market—a
collection of corporate persons entitled to due process dignity.
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is a Kantian defense for the Individual Mandate; and, in light of what
Kant’s theories teach us, the defense provides the integral ideas—i.e.,
the moral arguments—that define, establish, and enliven American due
process of law. Without this paradigm of dignity, decency, and
morality, all analogous precedents lack meaning. That is why a Kantian
defense of the Individual Mandate matters.
I. A TERSE PRÉCIS OF COMMERCE’S LINK WITH LIBERTY
Addressing what it perceived to be a singular crisis of national
proportions, Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act to foster
accessible, affordable, comprehensive, and reliable healthcare. 13 The
centerpiece and surely most controversial portion of the Affordable
Care Act, the Individual Mandate, 14 directs (with limited exceptions) 15
that by no later than January 1, 2014, all Americans either purchase
statutorily compliant health insurance or pay a tax penalty for failing to
do so. 16
13. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). See also
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW 1 (2011),
available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf (explaining the key provisions of
the Act).
14. Because it imposes tax penalties for failure to comply, the Individual Mandate is found in
subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, entitled “Miscellaneous Excise Taxes,” under Title 26 of
the United States Code.
15. The Act exempts, inter alia, unlawful aliens, prisoners, individuals whose household
income falls below the federal income tax filing minimum, members of Indian tribes, and persons
determined by the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to suffer “hardships.” 26
U.S.C. § 5000A(d)–(e) (2006).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b). Put briefly, the Affordable Care Act’s regulation of the health
insurance market rests on three legs. The first is “guaranteed issue,” meaning private carriers
must make health insurance available to all comers regardless of health status and preexisting
conditions. Moreover, insurance policies must cover such preexisting conditions. The second leg
is “community rating,” that is, carriers must charge identical rates to all purchasers as set by a
formula that, with very limited exceptions such as smoking, does not take into account either
preexisting conditions or personal habits considered inimical to good health. And the third leg is
the Individual Mandate that, by requiring substantially all otherwise uninsured adults to purchase
healthcare, provides income to carriers to offset the significant business costs of legs one and two.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2613–14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2644–45 (Scalia, J., with Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) [hereinafter Joint Dissent]. The justification is abolishing “free riders”—that is,
persons who, despite lacking insurance, will not be refused expensive medical treatment for
which they are unable to pay out-of-pocket. See, e.g., id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
Additionally, the Affordable Care Act creates state-controlled “Health Benefit Exchanges”
allowing individuals, families and small businesses to form pools for competitive purchasing, and
to obtain tax credits and subsidies, penalizes private employers that fail to provide minimum
health insurance to employees, and expands Medicaid eligibility and subsidies. See, e.g., State of
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir. 2011), rev. in
part and aff’d in part, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The latter
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Not surprisingly, Congress asserted the Commerce Clause as its
primary source of constitutional authority to enact the Affordable Care
Act. 17 Because access to, and the attendant costs of, healthcare
undeniably affect economies at all levels—personal, business, local,
state, and national—the bond between Congress’s Article I authority to
“regulate” interstate commerce and the Affordable Care Act’s direct
regulation of the multi-billion dollar health care market seemed
obvious. However, the Supreme Court rejected the Commerce Clause
in favor of the Taxing and Spending Clause as Congress’s legitimate
basis to enact the Individual Mandate. 18
A. Today’s Constitutional Benchmark: The “Economic Effects”
Standard
Based on the Sebelius Court’s constitutional law, a brief review of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides a useful prelude to this
Article’s proposed Kantian analysis. The core point is: While
“commerce” is certainly definable in its own right, that definition exists
within, is informed by, and indeed is subservient to the liberty principles
of due process 19 that vindicate our Constitution 20—the very principles
that Kantian morality elucidates. Thus, there is a vibrant tie between
the two clauses, Commerce and Due Process, that clarifies why settling
the Commerce Clause legitimacy of the Individual Mandate evokes a
concomitant “fundamental fairness” inquiry.
Beginning with the rudiments, the Constitution accords Congress
ostensibly limited regulatory authority; 21 enough to fulfill the

provision was struck by the Supreme Court as contravening the Tenth Amendment insofar as it
coerces states to enlarge their Medicaid programs. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07 (Roberts, C.J.,
with Beyer and Kagan, JJ.).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(1)–(2) (2006) (declaring that the Individual Mandate “is
commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce”).
18. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–601.
19. “Liberty” is generally definable as the “ability of individuals to engage in freedom of
action within society and free choice regarding most aspects of . . . private life.” JOHN E. NOWAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.4(d)(vii), at 669 (8th ed. 2010) (quoted in
Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors that Harm the
Environment, 61 DUKE L. J. 1111, 1152 n.166 (2012)).
20. I say “vindicate” because, as I attempted to show in earlier work, absent robust
enforcement of “due process,” a constitution, the government it structures, and the society it
governs are immoral and, thus, illegitimate. Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor:
Why the Constitution Is a Suicide Pact, 20 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 287, 335–46, 385–96
(2011).
21. Elementary Federalism informs that, “Congress’[s] authority is limited to those powers
enumerated in the Constitution.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)).
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“necessary and proper” work of a national government 22 but, very
importantly, duly constrained to forestall tyranny at the federal level. 23
Among its most lively powers, Congress may “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.” 24 At its core, the Commerce Clause accords Congress
discretion “to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed.” 25 This power is plenary and “like all others vested in
Congress, is complete in itself.” 26
Commerce Clause litigation commonly concerns whether Congress is
policing interstate (or international) commerce without impermissibly
intruding into intrastate commerce—that is, commerce “completely
internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or
between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to
or affect other States.” 27 To resolve that persistent inquiry, a pivotal
triumvirate of Supreme Court decisions—United States v. Lopez, 28
United States v. Morrison, 29 and Gonzales v. Raich 30—defined
“commerce” as “economic activity” of a “commercial character.” 31 In
other words, any congressional regulation of purported intrastate
commerce must involve actual “economic activity” linked fairly directly
to interstate commerce. 32 Thus, the Court understands commerce to
22. Congress is empowered “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution,” its enumerated powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
23. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “This constitutionally mandated
division of authority [between the federal and state levels] ‘was adopted by the Framers to ensure
protection of our fundamental liberties.’” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 52, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
at 2578 (“The Federal Government has expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, but it
still must show that a constitutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions.”). This Article
emphasizes this essential concept infra at notes 54–74 and accompanying text.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). The Clause’s vivacity reflects its historical
necessity: “The Commerce Clause emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem
giving rise to the Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the
Articles of Confederation.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005) (footnote omitted).
25. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
26. Id. See also Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903) (“Congress alone has the
power to occupy, by legislation, the whole field of interstate commerce.”).
27. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 194.
28. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
29. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
30. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
31. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 n.4. “[T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”
Id. at 613. See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60. The recent Sebelius ruling did not change this
constitutional threshold.
32. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. Certainly, this standard emphasizing commerciality
complements Chief Justice Marshall’s delineation, the most celebrated of all “commerce”
encapsulations: “Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It
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demarcate commercial dealings from all other social interactions. 33
For the purposes of this Article, the controlling question is not
whether these recent decisions establish a constitutionally apt standard
for enforcing one of Congress’s most forceful powers. 34 Nor is it
whether each precedent reached the correct holding. 35 Rather, the
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.” Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
at 189–90 (emphasis added).
33. Regarding application of the economics effects framework to the Lopez-Morrison-Raich
trilogy, Lopez invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)
(1988 ed., Supp. V), making it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”
That Act exceeded Congress’s commerce power because it neither regulated “commercial
activity” nor mandated any meaningful nexus between gun possession in school zones and
interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
Similarly, Morrison struck part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322,
§§ 40001–40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902–55, according a civil remedy to victims of “crime[s] of
violence motivated by gender.” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2006). The Court “reject[ed] the
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18.
By contrast, Raich upheld federal convictions under the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970), of individuals who, pursuant to California’s so-called medical
marijuana law, cultivated and used marijuana for certain medicinal purposes. The Court
concluded that Congress’s commerce authority “includes the power to prohibit the local
cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.” Raich, 529 U.S. at 9.
34. Not surprisingly, commentators disagree whether the Lopez-Morrison-Raich “economic
activity” standard sets an appropriate norm. For instance, Professor Randy Barnett believes, “the
economic-noneconomic distinction . . . is useful because the regulation of intrastate economic
activity is far more likely to be closely related to interstate commerce than is the vast array of
intrastate noneconomic activity.” Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the
Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 600
(2010). Professors Akhil Amar and Jack Balkin differ, urging that the Framers manifestly
understood “commerce” to encompass noneconomic as well as economic activity. See AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107–08 (2005); Jack M. Balkin,
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5, 15–16 (2010). This disagreement is discussed in Ian
Millhiser, Worse than Lochner, 29 YALE L. & PUB. POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 50, 60 (2011).
Similarly, four Justices chided the economic-noneconomic distinction with a particularly unkind
jurisprudential insult: “categorical formalism.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting).
35. Surely, it is not stunningly clear that the “possession” of guns in school zones, and the
possible resulting crimes, have but marginal effects on interstate commerce, particularly if one
were to “aggregate” all instances of such possession throughout the United States. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 602–03 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nor does it take the imagination of Jules Verne to
realize that, along with its toll on the human spirit, violent crimes against woman engender huge
expenditures in medical bills, police and court costs, victims’ lost earnings, employer’s lost
productivity, and other comparable expenses measurable in economic markets. Morrison, 529
U.S. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Similarly, a high market price for marijuana might induce some to sell rather than to ingest their
state-authorized medical marijuana, impeding Congress’s perceived legitimate interest to
eliminate the interstate demand for illegal drugs. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19–20 & n.29. Still, if the
undisputed market consequences of both firearms in school zones and criminal assaults against
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inquiries are: how did the Court come to this “economic activity”
paradigm; and what, if anything, does this history divulge about why
commerce disputes actually concern due process liberty?
B. The Four Judicial Phases of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Indulging comfortable hindsight, the arc of Commerce Clause law
over two-and-a-quarter centuries embracing expansive Congressional
oversight seems inevitable, or at least historically and societally
coherent, considering the advent of immense industrialization, mass
communications, easily accessible national and international transit,
computerization virtually for all, urbanization, and unparalleled growth
of knowledge. 36 In such a society—indeed, in such a world—scant
individual or corporate commercial behavior seems remote from
business markets spanning States. Thus, while utterly “intrastate”
commerce still remains beyond its reach, even under Lopez-MorrisonRaich, Congress enjoys substantial discretion to manage interstate
commercial activity by manipulating intrastate realms.
These
precedents echo the Court’s frequent assertion that Congress’s
commerce authority includes regulating “purely local activities that are
part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.” 37
The chronicle of judicial efforts to resolve the vexing dilemma of
intrastate commerce’s constitutional connection to interstate commerce
reveals roughly four historical phases. During the first phase, starting
with Gibbons v. Ogden 38 and continuing until about 1918, courts
accepted that Congress’s commerce power comprised thoroughgoing
authority to exclude products from the flow of commerce, including
those manufactured intrastate. Exemplifying the enduring breadth and
depth of its commerce authority then (as now), Congress may regulate
women were insufficient to sustain the congressional legislation in Lopez and Morrison, the
purported constitutionally adequate “economic effects” of a “commercial character” in Raich—
that possibly some gravely ill private growers will sell their cannabis rather than use it to alleviate
their severe medical symptoms—are questionable to say the least. Raich, 545 U.S. at 52
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at
568 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The progression of our Commerce Clause cases . . . was not
marked, however, by a coherent or consistent course of interpretation; for neither the course of
technological advance nor the foundational principles for the jurisprudence itself were selfevident to the courts that sought to resolve contemporary disputes by enduring principles.”).
37. Raich, 454 U.S. at 17. Similarly, the Court ruled in Lopez that Congress may “regulate
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558–59 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09.
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
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commerce to promote market efficiencies for their own sake, or to
foster moral agendas by barring arguably harmful products and immoral
behavior from the flow of interstate commerce. 39 Thus, it has always
been within Congress competence to use its commerce discretion to
promote or to forestall behavior not for the economic effects such
behavior engenders, but due to such behavior’s perceived moral worth
or corruption.
During the early 1900s—perhaps best exemplified by 1918’s
Hammer v. Dagenhart 40—the paradigm shifted to hold “that Congress
could not use its power over interstate commerce as a pretext to reach
such economic but non-federally commercial intrastate activities as
manufacturing or agriculture, activities which were instead within the
police power of states to regulate.” 41 The generally accepted (although
perhaps sketchy) explanation for this second phase is “laissez-faire
economics, the point of which was . . . trying to create a laissez-faire
world out of the 20th-century economy, and formalistic commercial
distinctions were thought to be useful instruments in achieving that
object.” 42
39. Millhiser, supra note 34, at 53 (footnotes omitted). See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry.
Co., 242 U.S. 311, 327 (1917) (upholding statute restricting interstate sale of alcoholic
beverages); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913) (upholding statute banning
transportation of prostitutes in interstate commerce). As the Court famously ruled almost a
century ago, “[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.”
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964) (holding that Congress could use the Commerce Clause to
force private business to abide by Title II (the public accommodations provision) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding the
public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Groome Resources Ltd. v.
Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 209 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding the Fair Housing Amendments
Act’s reasonable accommodations provisions); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 493 & n.2 (4th
Cir. 2000) (upholding federal regulations to protect and preserve endangered species). But see
Patton, 451 F.3d at 621 (holding that a statute criminalizing possession of body armor by felon
was outside interstate commerce).
40. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding Congress’s statute barring interstate
sale of products made by child labor as improper interference with state manufacturing).
41. Barnett, supra note 34, at 589 (footnote omitted). See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 642–43
(Souter, J., dissenting) (finding that Morrison unnecessarily and wrongly revived the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial conduct).
42. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 643–44 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Concurrent with
restricting Congress’s commerce powers ostensibly to protect states’ authority to regulate
manufacturing, the Court entered the discreditable epoch familiarly known as Lochnerism, taking
its name from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Therein, the Court controversially
ruled, “The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the [substantive]
liberty of the individual protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] 14th Amendment . . . . The
right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment.” Id. at 53. In
sum, under Lochnerism, the Court struck, as violating substantive due process, state laws
regulating business and industry—the same types of laws that the Court held Congress could not
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The third Commerce Clause phase began in 1937 when the Court
renounced its former ostensible laissez-faire economic paradigm in
favor of deference to congressional and state economic regulation,
thereby addressing critics who claimed that the judicial branch had
indulged an illegitimate quasi-legislative posture to impose its social
policy preferences as constitutional law. Adopting the “substantial
effects test,” the Court held that intrastate activities evincing “such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions,” are within Congress’s power to regulate. 43 Underscoring
its new understanding, the Court asserted, “While manufacture is not of
itself interstate commerce the shipment of manufactured goods
interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of such shipment by
Congress is indubitably a regulation of the commerce.” 44
Surely the most prominent incarnation of “post-1937” Commerce

enact because such regulation of manufacturing was the exclusive province of state governments.
See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1362 (11th Cir. 2011)
(Murphy, J., dissenting in part) (summarizing the “bygone” Lochner era as a period where
“substantive due process was more broadly interpreted as also encompassing and protecting the
right, liberty, or freedom of contract”), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Although substantially repudiated during the same time the judiciary entered the third phase of
its commerce jurisprudence, Lochner’s mistake was not its philosophy that the due process
clauses contain implicit substantive as well procedural meanings (although for many years the
courts were highly skeptical of arguments based on unenumerated substantive due process rights).
As the Court rhetorically inquired in 1937, “What is this freedom [of contract]? The Constitution
does not speak of freedom of contract.” W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
Rather, Lochner’s foundational premise remains the Constitution’s prevailing paradigm: the Due
Process Clauses invalidate all arbitrary or unreasonable federal, state and local governmental
conduct. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56; id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 76 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Pursuant to this standard, contemporary constitutional theory recognizes a small core
of substantive due process rights, predominately involving personal privacy, and all considered
essential to “ordered liberty.” Specific rights include, “the rights to marry, to have children, to
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to
bodily integrity, and to abortion.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
(citations omitted). In addition, through substantive due process, the courts discerned an equal
protection command applicable at the federal level under the Fifth Amendment and have
“incorporated,” that is, applied to the states, almost all of the Bill of Rights. See Bayer, supra
note 20, at 393–96. Thus, Lochner’s error was averring that included within substantive due
process is a specific, private right of contract, or, as the cliché would have it, the Lochner Court
entered the “right church,” but chose the “wrong pew.”
43. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
44. Darby, 312 U.S. at 113. Applying the familiar “rational basis” approach, the Court
subsequently explained that so long as the effects on commerce are more than “trivial,”
congressional legislation affecting even intrastate commerce is lawful. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 197 (1968) (discussing the substantial effects standard).
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Clause theory is Wickard v. Filburn, 45 in which the Court augmented
the already generous “substantial effects” test with the “aggregation”
principle. Wickard held that applying the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938’s (“AAA”) wheat production quotas to farmer Roscoe
Philburn’s “home-grown and home-consumed wheat” fell within
Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 46 Because home-consumed
wheat “constitute[d] the most variable factor in the disappearance of the
wheat crop,” 47 the Wickard Court concluded that Filburn’s homeconsumed wheat competed with wheat he otherwise would have had to
purchase on the open market. 48 In rejecting the argument that his
excess wheat’s production and use were effectively “local,” the Court
held that Philburn’s slight impact on the interstate wheat market, when
aggregated with other such seemingly insular uses, resulted in
significant interstate consequences. 49 Because Congress’s commerce
power includes authority to affect markets by regulating the price and
supply of commodities, “[i]t can hardly be denied that a factor of such
volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a
substantial influence on price and market conditions.” 50
Whatever practical economic rationality underpins Wickard’s
commerce analysis, its logical ending point is no mystery: modernity
hurls the Commerce Clause’s “substantial effects” cum aggregation
methodology directly into intrastate commerce’s heart. Six decades
after Wickard, Justice Breyer aptly stated the palpable, central fact: “We
live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific,
technological, commercial, and environmental change. Those changes,
taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how
local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the
State—at least when considered in the aggregate.” 51 If Roscoe
45. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
46. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1269 (discussing Wickard). As the Supreme Court explained, the
AAA’s applicable schema
fixes a quota including all that the farmer may harvest for sale or for his own farm
needs, and declares that wheat produced on excess acreage may neither be disposed of
nor used except upon payment of the penalty or except it is stored as required by the
Act or delivered to the Secretary of Agriculture.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119. Philburn exceeded his AAA-allotted 11.1 acres of wheat by 11.9
acres, an amount that Court accepted was used exclusively for home consumption and not
commercial farming. Id. at 125–27.
47. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.
48. Id. at 128.
49. Id. at 125–27.
50. Id. at 128.
51. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 660 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices
Kennedy and O’Connor offered the same sentiment five years prior to Morrison: “In a sense any
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Filburn’s growing and consumption of a bit of wheat is subject to
congressional commerce regulation, any behavior, incurring any
economic impact, no matter how local or private, is seemingly federally
governable.
There are two possible resolutions to this dilemma. The first is that,
consistent with Wickard, contemporary commercialism has begot a
practical federal power to regulate all commerce in America because
intrastate commerce virtually is extinct. The second is that economic
actuality be damned if its consequence is annulling any meaningful role
intrastate commerce has under the Constitution. Answering this
delicate constitutional predicament opened the fourth phase of
Commerce Clause history, one that purports to salvage the viability of
intrastate commerce. The effort to bridle Wickard straddles the three
earlier mentioned Supreme Court decisions—Lopez, Morrison, and
Gonzales—that adopted the “economic activity” of a “commercial
character” standard. 52 As previously discussed, any congressional
regulation of intrastate commerce must concern actual “economic
activity”—that is, actual commercial pursuit—linked fairly directly to
interstate commerce. 53
C. Commerce, Federalism, and Individual Liberty
This latest governing test and whether it actually vouchsafes
intrastate commerce 54 begs the pivotal question: why should we care
conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence
. . . .” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., with O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
52. See supra notes 27–37 and accompanying text. As Morrison summarized, “[I]n every
case where we have sustained federal regulation under the aggregation principle, the regulated
activity was of an apparent commercial character.” 529 U.S. at 611 n.4 (citation omitted). See
generally Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual
Mandate, 100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1129 (2012) (discussing how Lopez arguably reinterpreted
Wickard).
53. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (discussing Congress’s power to
regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce). Sebelius has added
one important corollary: Congress cannot “compel individuals not engaged in commerce to
purchase an unwanted product.” 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). See
also id. at 2643–46 (Joint Dissent). See also infra notes 75–87 and accompanying text
(discussing that while Congress does not have the authority to force individuals to purchase
products, Congress does have the power to impose a tax).
54. Professor Barnett observed,
In the wake of Morrison, law professors started to believe that the Court just might be
serious about drawing a line between what is national and what is local . . . . [After
Raich,] law professors breathed a sigh of relief that they had been right all along. They
reverted to their pre-Lopez understanding that Congress can do pretty much whatever it
wants under its commerce power.
Barnett, supra note 34, at 588.
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about intrastate commerce at all? If modernity has killed intrastate
commerce, thus manifestly demarcating our era from the experiences of
the Framers, reasonable persons should wonder, for what legitimate
purpose would the Constitution resurrect that which today’s economics
renders superfluous? The answer must be that something other than
innately defined “commerce” actually animates the Commerce Clause.
Not unexpectedly, that something else is individual liberty, which
indeed has commanded commerce jurisprudence for roughly two
centuries.
Granted, courts commonly describe Congress’s commerce power as
grounded in expediency rather than originating from some pristine a
priori quintessence. As the celebrated judicial rationalist Oliver
Wendell Holmes offered, “[C]ommerce among the States is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of
business.” 55 To a considerable extent, Holmesian pragmatism has
guided Commerce Clause philosophy throughout the twentieth century
and into the new millennium. 56
Nonetheless, practical commercial reality is not, and correctly never
has been, sufficient to explicate entirely Congress’s commerce
regulating authority. As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Gibbons v.
Ogden nearly 200 years ago, “This power, like all others vested in
Congress, . . . acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the constitution.” 57 Accordingly, the Commerce Clause is restrained to
the extent its exercise conflicts with other constitutional requisites.
Indeed, eighty-one years later, at the turn of the outset of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court in Champion v. Ames elucidated Gibbons in
terms of the Constitution’s greatest requisite, liberty: “[T]he power of
Congress to regulate commerce among the states, although plenary,
cannot be deemed arbitrary, since it is subject to such limitations or
restrictions as are prescribed by the Constitution. This power, therefore,
may not be exercised so as to infringe rights secured or protected by
that instrument.” 58
The judiciary has fulfilled Ames’s elegant imperative by affirming
55. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
56. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573–74 (1995) (Kennedy, J., with O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (discussing, “the fair ambit of the Court’s practical conception of commercial
regulation”); N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (“Congress is not bound by technical
legal conceptions. Commerce itself is an intensely practical matter. To deal with it effectively,
Congress must be able to act in terms of economic and financial realities.” (citation omitted));
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1937) (“[I]nterstate commerce itself
is a practical conception.”).
57. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (emphasis added).
58. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 362–63 (1903) (emphasis added).
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that, despite the Commerce Clause’s substantial scope, Congress cannot
distort its commerce license by adopting a general “federal police
power” to regulate what it will, when it will, as it will. 59 Such power
would transgress crucial constitutional Federalism by tapping into the
domain of the Tenth Amendment, which reads, “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 60
This Amendment recognizes an enveloping realm of state “police
power,” or comprehensive regulatory authority. 61 Thus, albeit limited
by both the enumerated powers at the federal level and individual rights
emanating from, inter alia, the Bill of Rights and the post-Civil War
Amendments, “the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of
the Federal Government.” 62
The necessity to harmonize the state and federal domains reveals a
truth critical to understanding the Individual Mandate, commerce, tax,
and, indeed, the exercise of any congressional power: Federalism cannot
be appreciated, much less correctly achieved, through pure
constitutional formalism. That Congress’s power ends somewhere in
favor of states’ rights is not true simply because the Tenth Amendment
declares, and thus supposes, a zone of undivided state legal authority.
Precedent rightly rejects the formalistic argument that as part of the

59. As the Morrison Court reiterated, “With its careful enumeration of federal powers and
explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal Government are reserved, the
Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal Government an unlimited
license to regulate.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (citations omitted).
See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (discussing that the
police power is a power reserved for the states and not the federal government); Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 564–65 (noting that the limitations placed on the federal government’s commerce power are
often indistinguishable and hard to define).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
61. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (stating that the regulation and punishment of actions not
directed at the “instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always
been the province of the States”).
62. Taffin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); accord Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457
(1991). Courts acknowledge that due to the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the
“Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this delicate balance . . . . As long as it is
acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on the
States.” Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460. Still, as James Madison explained,
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite . . . . The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of
the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292–93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (stating that a power not conferred to the federal
government in the Constitution is withheld and belongs to the states).
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Constitution, and thus presumed to have some functional meaning, the
Tenth Amendment embodies domains of state regulatory exclusivity,
even if only to endow titular enforcement by giving that Amendment
something to do. 63 In other words, limits on Congress’s “practical”
exercise of its commerce authority are not proved under a theory that
economic pragmatism cannot obviate the Tenth Amendment. Rather,
the uneasy armistice between Article I and the Tenth Amendment is
based on the predominant political theory premising our Constitution: a
rule of law that governs without tyranny. In this pivotal regard, judges
can discern the harmony of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment—where one ends and others begin—only by enforcing the
principles of individual liberty, which is the Constitution’s greatest
duty.
Certainly, the Supreme Court’s current commerce jurisprudence
hastens to so remind us: “As we have repeatedly noted, the Framers
crafted the federal system of Government so that the people’s rights
would be secured by the division of power.” 64 The Court very recently
unambiguously reaffirmed that “Federalism secures the freedom of the
individual,” 65 smartly linking this integral thesis to the Constitution’s
63. In fact, the Supreme Court has emphasized that because its language is circular, a plain
meaning or textual construction of the Tenth Amendment to discern the elaborate equilibrium of
Federalism is impossible: That the Tenth Amendment
restrains the power of Congress . . . is not derived from the text of the Tenth
Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the
Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to
limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.
New York, 505 U.S. at 156–57.
64. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 (citations omitted). See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552, 564
(discussing the balance of power between the federal government and the states).
65. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363 (2011). See also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.
Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011) (noting that the separation of powers protects the individual in addition to
protecting each branch of government from intrusion by other branches); New York, 505 U.S. at
181 (“The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or
state governments as abstract political entities . . . . To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”); Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. at 2578 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The Federal Government has expanded dramatically
over the past two centuries, but it still must show that a constitutional grant of power authorizes
each of its actions.”).
Indeed, not a decade after the Constitution’s ratification, Justice Cushing explained the
constitutional quintessence that after 220 years still remains the foundation of American law:
The rights of individuals and the justice due to them, are as dear and precious as those
of States. Indeed the latter are founded upon the former; and the great end and object
of them must be to secure and support the rights of individuals, or else vain is
Government.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 468 (1793) (opinion of Cushing, J.), overruled U.S.
CONST. amend. XI. Chief Justice Jay concurred, stating that “the sovereignty of the nation is in
the people of the nation, and the residuary sovereignty of each State in the people of each
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entire structure of American Government: “Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.” 66 In Sebelius, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito
expressed this point with telling, yet quiet passion:
Structural protections—notably, the restraints imposed by federalism
and separation of powers—are less romantic and have less obvious a
connection to personal freedom than the provisions of the Bill of
Rights or the Civil War Amendments. Hence they tend to be
undervalued or even forgotten by our citizens. It should be the
responsibility of the Court to teach otherwise, to remind our people
that the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most
important ones, for which reason they alone were embodied in the
original Constitution and not left to later amendment. The
fragmentation of power produced by the structure of our Government
is central to liberty, and when we destroy it, we place liberty at peril. 67

The foregoing theory of dual sovereignty portends its own controlling
principle: to effectuate its emphasis on liberty, both Federalism and the
Commerce Clause it encompasses are tamed and indeed civilized by the
Constitution’s greatest liberty protection, “due process of law” 68—
rightfully identified by noted constitutional scholar Justice Felix
Frankfurter as “ultimate decency in a civilized society.” 69 Indeed,
because they are the Constitution’s principal arbiters of “fundamental
fairness,” 70 the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
State . . . . [A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the
sovereigns of the country.” Id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). Similarly, James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton touted Federalism as one of the yet-to-be-ratified Constitution’s prime
bulwarks against governmental subjugation. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Id. NO. 20, at 180–81 (Alexander Hamilton).
66. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
67. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676–77 (2012) (Joint Dissent). I
leave for another article the argument that because due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments actually is the Constitution’s true and decisive safeguard against governmental
subjugation; those amendments have obviated reliance on the Tenth Amendment as a source of
liberty. I accept for this discussion the judicial avowal that absent Federalism, individual liberty
is in jeopardy. Accordingly, determining whether Congress’s enactments contravene the Tenth
Amendment requires an assessment of the threat to individual liberty that, of course, is the
exclusive province of due process.
68. See Sec’y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950) (noting that the
Commerce Clause cannot defy due process).
69. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), overruled on
other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
70. See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S.
735, 770–71 (2006); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001); United States v. Salerno,
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Amendments are the repository of America’s “deepest notions of what
is fair and right and just.” 71 Thus, “not even resort to the Commerce
Clause can defy the standards of due process,” 72 which is a logical
subset of the dominant premise of constitutional law. The “fundamental
guarantee of due process is absolute and not merely relative. . . . [T]he
constitutional safeguard as to due process [is] at all times dominant and
controlling where the Constitution is applicable.” 73
Because commerce litigation is not, and never has been simply a
matter of defining “commerce” apart from the greater constitutional
precepts in which it lives, only the strictures of due process can verify
the Individual Mandate’s Commerce Clause compliance vel non.
Indeed, the core argument against the Individual Mandate is that it
unconstitutionally intrudes into both individual liberty and the liberty of
the States. 74
D. Why the Individual Mandate Comports with Congress’s Power to
Tax, but Not Its Power to Regulate Commerce
Despite the undeniable adverse economic effects that the willingly
uninsured inflict on the healthcare market, 75 the Supreme Court ruled
481 U.S. 739, 746–48 (1987); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 177 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
71. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added),
abrogated by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
72. Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. at 616. See also Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939)
(discussing that while there is no uniformity requirement in connection with the Commerce
Clause, the power is still subject to the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100,
1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (outlining the finding in Central Roig Refining Co.); United States v. Hawes,
529 F.2d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that the commerce power is subject to the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
73. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350 (1909). See also United States v.
Smith, 480 F.2d 664, 668 n.9 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the guarantee of due process is one of
the most important protections found in the Constitution).
74. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan agreed that the challengers’ position
implied a substantive due process matter that had not been pressed, except that the parties
ultimately conceded that “the provisions here at issue do not offend the Due Process Clause.”
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2623 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito likewise recognized the liberty aspect, invoking the startling specter of
liberty’s greatest foe, involuntary servitude: “Here, however, Congress has impressed into service
third parties, healthy individuals who could be but are not customers of the relevant industry, to
offset the undesirable consequences of the regulation.” Id. at 2646 (Joint Dissent) (emphasis
added). Indeed, those Justices cited Hamilton’s horrific metaphor that such power would
transform Government into a “‘hideous monster whose devouring jaws . . . spare neither sex nor
age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane.’” Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 202
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
75. As the Eleventh Circuit summarized the Government’s data-laden legal theory, “Given the
50 million uninsured, $43 billion in uncompensated costs, and $90 billion in underwriting costs,
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that pursuant to the Framers’ original understanding of the nature of
commerce, Congress has no authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact the Individual Mandate. 76 Briefly put, “The language of the
Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate
assumes there is already something to be regulated.” 77 Accordingly,
Congress has no authority to create a sphere of regulable commerce by
inventing the commerce itself. Rather, Congress can only regulate
extant markets. 78
Based on this arguably formalistic standard
emanating from the Founder’s perceived definition of “commerce,”
Congress cannot force individuals to purchase products from markets in
which they are not otherwise engaged. 79 For this reason, the Court held
that the Individual Mandate is unsupportable under the Commerce
Clause. 80
Congress determined these problems affect the national economy and interstate commerce.”
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted), rev. in part and aff’d in part, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012). Uncompensated costs, or cost shifting, means costs borne by medical providers, and
often passed to predominately insured medical consumers, due to treating those who lack any or
sufficient insurance coverage. According to Congress, “the mandate will reduce the number of
the uninsured and the $43 billion cost-shifting and thereby ‘lower health insurance premiums.’”
Id. at 1298 (citation omitted).
76. Arguably, that ruling is dictum in that, by upholding the Individual Mandate under the
Article I’s Taxing and Spending Clause, it is unclear whether the Court needed to reach the
commerce issue at all. That the Individual Mandate might fall beyond Article I’s Commerce
Clause power does not render it any less lawful under the Taxing and Spending Clause. See Did
Chief Justice Roberts Craft a New, More Limited Commerce Clause?, CONST. L. PROF BLOG,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2012/06/did-chief-justice-roberts-craft-a-new-morelimited-commerce-clause.html (last visited June 20, 2012).
77. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,
C.J.).
78. Id. at 2644 (Joint Dissent).
79. Id. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644–50 (Joint Dissent). One might retort that
the market for health insurance existed prior to the Affordable Care Act. Thus, Congress did not
create a new market to regulate; rather, it compelled unwilling individuals into the extant
insurance marketplace. The Court’s arguably strained rendition of markets all the more implies a
not too hidden true rationale sounding in liberty.
80. In addition to averring that such is the original understanding, the Court offered a libertyinspired corollary, arguing that despite its apparent effects on economic markets, if inactivity
legally is commerce, there is no ending point constraining Congress’s power to control virtually
all human conduct. “Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals
precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to
congressional authority. . . . Every day individuals do not do an infinite number of things.” Id. at
2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Indeed, the Court accepted the much publicized horrible that
Congress could force people to buy virtually anything, epitomized by a mandate to purchase
broccoli if that market’s viability were in jeopardy. Id. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at
2650 (Joint Dissent).
The slippery slope argument, of course, is unavailing when divorced from the text of the
Commerce Clause and viewed, instead, from the perspective of the Constitution as an entirety. If
political expediency fails to quench Congress’s thirst to impose imprudent laws, the Fifth

7_BAYER

886

3/9/2013 1:37 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

Despite judicial fears of untrammeled commerce authority, Sebelius
upheld seemingly comparable congressional willfulness, ruling the
Individual Mandate valid under Congress’s power to “lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” 81 As
Chief Justice Roberts explained the proposition, “Put simply, Congress
may tax and spend. This grant gives the Federal Government
considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate.
The Federal Government may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot
authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.” 82 According to the Sebelius
Majority, the Individual Mandate presents taxpayers with a lawful
“option”: buy health insurance or pay a tax penalty to the U.S.
Treasury. 83 Granted, taxpayers are compelled to make that choice, and
either decision will cost them money that they otherwise might have
spent differently. Nonetheless, the Court accented the familiar precept
that Congress may tax not only to raise revenue, but also to encourage
laudable behavior, such as purchasing health insurance. 84
Sebelius evinces that Congress has an extraordinary reach to affect
individual conduct pursuant to its taxing powers that it lacks under the
Commerce Clause. To offer an evident example, Sebelius apparently
recognizes Congress’s power to require persons to pay a tax if they
refuse to buy broccoli. 85 There is an explanation why the Court may be
Amendment will, at least in so far as it requires the federal level to govern within the limits of due
process. Therefore, should commanding unwilling consumers to purchase broccoli not constitute
a liberty violation, there is no constitutional reason why Congress cannot so mandate and let the
political process determine if such a law will stand. Id. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Indeed, the Joint Dissent implicitly so
acknowledged, noting that during oral argument the federal government was unable to articulate a
limiting principle, “other than those explicitly prohibited by the Bill of Rights or other
constitutional controls.” Id. at 2647 (Joint Dissent).
81. Id. at 2579 (majority opinion) (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 2599–600. For the argument that the Individual Mandate’s tax “penalty” indeed is a
tax under the Constitution, see id.
84. See id. at 2596 (“[T]axes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new. . . . Indeed,
every tax is in some measure regulatory.” (citation omitted)).
85. Unlike the Commerce Clause, there apparently is little jurisprudence addressing
Federalism limits on Congress’s taxing power. See Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing
Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975, 1026–27 (2011) (arguing Federalism should constrain Congress’s
taxing power to the same extent it constrains Congress’s spending power). Accordingly,
Professor Mason labeled the taxing power “the Constitution’s hidden giant.” Id. at 1035. Of
course, regardless of whether Federalism’s restrictions on taxing are greater, lesser or equal to
commerce regulation, due process—i.e., Federalism’s true interest—controls Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1. See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
For an informative analysis of both the history of American tax jurisprudence and the difficult
dilemma of distinguishing between lawful taxes and unlawful “regulations backed by penalties”
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unbothered by that breadth of authority, when it rejected as profoundly
dangerous such latitude under the Commerce Clause. The Due Process
Clauses prevent federal or state taxation that is so excessive, punitive,
unequal, or otherwise arbitrary that it offends the principle of liberty.
No less than commerce, governmental authority at any level to tax is
constrained by due process. 86 Accordingly, despite the Individual
Mandate’s legitimacy under the Taxing and Spending Clause, and
despite each state’s presumptive authority under the Tenth Amendment
to enact its own individual mandate, 87 should the Individual Mandate
violate due process liberty principles, such legislation would be
irredeemably unconstitutional. Accordingly, this Article next addresses
the matter of liberty under due process of law.
II. THE KANTIAN DEFENSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
As I observed in an article addressing due process theory generally,
Few philosophers have provoked the imagination and engendered the
respect of modern legal theorists as has Immanuel Kant. Perhaps
more than any other post-Hellenistic thinker before him, Kant
provided a workable articulation of [ethical theory—]the abstract
moral base below which human behavior and the laws regulating
human behavior cannot go. 88

As explicated below, because enforcing due process of law is the prime
imperative of any legitimate government, and because the United States
has explicitly accepted that truly moral responsibility pursuant to the
posing as taxes, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects
Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1219 (2012). Of course, as the Individual
Mandate demonstrates, not unlike commerce enactments, tax regimes combine an economic
motive—raising revenue—with a societal motive—encouraged perceived valuable behavior of
discouraging perceived harmful behavior. See id. at 1219–20.
86. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1992) (“[D]ue process requires
some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax.”); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954) (same);
Red Earth LLC v. United States, 657 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2011) (same). See also Brushaber v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1916) (finding arbitrary taxation likely constitutes
deprivation of property without due process of law); Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961, 969
(9th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30–32 (1994) (holding that
retroactively applied tax may violate due process); Picano v. Borough of Emerson, 353 F. App’x
733, 735 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a tax must not offend substantive due process); Berne Corp.
v. Govt. of the Virgin Islands, 570 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a taxpayer must
have procedural due process rights to challenge the legality of a tax or application thereof).
87. Assuming Congress has not preempted states from doing so. See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R.
Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1265–66 (2012) (explaining the federal preemption
doctrine); Lorrilard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–42 (2001) (same).
88. Bayer, supra note 20, at 346 (emphasis added) (citing David Gray Carlson, Hart avec
Kant: On the Inseparability of Law and Morality, 1 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 21, 33 (2009) (“Kant’s
project was to render morality undogmatic—to ground it in the fact of reason.”)).
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Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, Kantian theory provides the
discrete concepts to understand whether the Individual Mandate offends
the liberty interests protected by due process.
Before explaining Kant’s specific philosophy and how it applies to
law, this Article addresses briefly why, as Kant believed, morality, and
thus due process of law, is deontological rather than consequentialist. 89
That is, due process is not concerned with generating the most pleasant
or popular outcome or consequence. Rather, because it is based on a
priori, transcendent principles of moral rightness derived from reason,
due process must be obeyed regardless of the ensuing consequences (no
matter how terrible).
The second stage, of course, is establishing the framework for due
process Deontology. Believing that Kantian ethics offers the soundest
moral philosophy yet expressed, this Article reviews Kant’s liberal
theory explaining why individuals’ compulsory moral duties require the
formation of societies governed by due process of law. Such
governance is necessary if persons are to exercise liberty—that is, seek
self-fulfillment by pursuing happiness—in an ethical manner. From the
necessity to build ethically governed social orders, Kant reasonably
derived not a personal task, but rather a governmental, non-delegable
duty to aid those who are so poor that, absent relief, they are merely
beggars, unable to function with human dignity, and thus are not free to
pursue happiness within the strictures of morality. Based on these
theories of personal morality and governmental duties, this Article
implores that lack of access to meaningful health care is an entirely
consistent contemporary form of destitution, validating governmental
intervention, such as the Individual Mandate.
A. Moral Theory Is Deontological, Not Utilitarian/Consequentialist
Commentaries defending the Individual Mandate typically exploit
consequentialist policy arguments. To illustrate with one prominent
example, Professors Jedediah Purdy and Neil Siegel recently
pronounced: “We think it uncontroversial that contemporary social
morality permits some solution to the problems of cost-shifting and
adverse selection in healthcare and health insurance markets; ours is not
a society in which people are generally entitled to impose significant

89. Utilitarianism is the most well-known form of Consequentialism. Bayer, supra note 20, at
294 (citations omitted). For purposes of this Article, the specific elaborations that the former
offers the latter are immaterial. Therefore, this Article uses the two terms interchangeably.
Similarly, it uses the terms morality and ethically, and morals and ethics, as essentially
synonymous.
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material harms on others, whether financial or otherwise.” 90 Purdy and
Siegel base their conclusion on famed utilitarian John Stuart Mill’s
“harm principle,” espousing that “society may interfere with an
individual’s decision to do or not do as he or she wishes . . . [when
such] individuals act or decline to act in ways that cause harm to
important interests of others.” 91
Fully consistent with consequentialist theory, Mill’s “harm principle”
is predicated on the utilitarian practice of enforcing, using Purdy and
Siegel’s term, “contemporary social morality,” chiefly through law. 92
Purdy and Siegel accent the arguably immoral behavior of free riders:
persons who could afford but refuse to buy insurance, eventually will
need medical care, and will eagerly consume high-priced healthcare, the
costs of which will be passed onto innocent others because the ill
individuals are unable to pay their high medical costs due to their
uninsured status. 93 By failing to pay for such services, the free riders
raise the overall price of healthcare that hospitals charge insured
patients, leading to increased premiums and costs imposed on the very
persons who have responsibly purchased health insurance. 94 Because
the free riders unethically enjoy their free ride while the insured are
penalized for their prudence, maturity and conscientiousness, Purdy and
Siegel conclude that the Individual Mandate is lawful under Mill’s
“harm principle.” Such reasoning is classic Consequentialism: the
belief that the right answer derives from “contemporary social morality”
reflecting the purported best overall outcome measured by some
quantum of societal satisfaction. 95
But “best outcomes” is neither an appropriate nor accurate basis to
90. Jedediah Purdy & Neil S. Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The Minimum Coverage
Provision, Mill’s “Harm Principle,” and American Social Morality, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 374,
389 (2012) (first emphasis added).
91. See id. at 382 (discussing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 139 (David Bromwich &
George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859)).
92. Id. at 385, 388.
93. Indeed, hospitals that provide emergency treatment may not refuse to treat uninsured
persons who otherwise are unable to pay for medical services. See Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
94. Purdy & Siegel, supra note 90, at 386 (footnote omitted).
95. As Professor Blum explains,
“Consequentialists maintain that choices are not morally “good” or “bad” in
themselves, but should instead be assessed solely by virtue of the outcomes they bring
about, that is, by their consequences.” Accordingly, consequentialists aver that the
proper consequence—outcome—of any morally uncertain instance is the one that
promotes the greatest good, meaning the greatest happiness.”
Bayer, supra note 20, at 294 (emphasis added) (quoting Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and
the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 38 n.166 (2010)) (citing ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN
ETHICS 262 (2008)).
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evaluate the very morality—the liberty implications of the Individual
Mandate—that Purdy and Siegel extol. Even assuming that the
Individual Mandate accomplishes its presumably beneficent purpose, it
nevertheless violates due process of law if it unduly constrains personal
liberty. As do all fundamental rights, liberty protects individuals from
illicit “contemporary social morality”; that is, a majority’s (even an
overwhelming majority’s) possibly well-intentioned but misguided will.
To raise the classic exemplar, due process will not sustain the
unconstitutional conviction of a guilty person even if Society would be
safer from violence if that individual were incarcerated. Thus,
aggregate happiness identified as “prevailing social morality” is
precisely what due process does not protect.
This understanding brings us to Consequentialism’s palpable
problem: the fact that persons agree on any particular moral point
proves only their collective level of accord—that is, what some, most,
or all people want their world to be. Consensus provides no
independent basis to verify the correctness of moral answers unless one
simply wishes to declare that morality is defined by popular fiat. 96
Under such a theory, abominations like racism, slavery, and genocide
are immoral only if enough members of a given social order so agree. 97
With respect to the Individual Mandate, suppose Purdy and Siegel’s
assumption regarding contemporary popular morality is wrong or is
correct today but popular sentiment changes tomorrow? If a majority of
Americans decide that tyranny includes Government impelling
unwilling persons into undesired commercial markets, or if the
prevailing morality shifts so that any impetus to help the unhealthy poor
inures purely to the private sector, Consequentialism would require
Purdy and Siegel to declare that the Individual Mandate is
unconstitutional. Based on the tenor of their article, those latter policies
do not comport with Purdy and Siegel’s moral stance. It is unlikely
these scholars would abandon the Individual Mandate simply due to a
change in civic sentiment.
Utilitarians like Professors Purdy and Siegel frequently attempt to
escape this dilemma by incorporating humanizing controls. 98 Their
tactics
are
unavailing
because,
put
coarsely,
reformed
96. WOOD, supra note 95, at 266–68.
97. Bayer, supra note 20, at 322 (citing JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
RIGHT 91 n.1 (1994)).
98. For example, Mill tempered his utilitarianism with “Romanticism, the discovery . . . of the
depth and intensity, the opacity and beauty, of individual experience and identity.” Purdy &
Siegel, supra note 90, at 384. See Bayer, supra note 20, at 322–28 (discussing futile attempts to
salvage Consequentialism by incorporating, inter alia, ideas concerning “the right ways” to do
things or some overarching “sense of fitness”).

7_BAYER

2013]

3/9/2013 1:37 PM

The Individual Mandate’s Due Process Legality

891

Consequentialism—defining morality as what makes the largest number
of persons happy excluding Society’s unenlightened wretches—still
erroneously defines morality based on popular sentiments instead of
impartial precepts. Thus, to prevent its own abuses, reformed
Consequentialism wants a priori ethics, but cannot bring itself to so
admit publically. Indeed, Purdy and Siegel deride at the idea of
applicable transcendent ethics:
No doubt many [persons] today believe that the moral and
philosophical truth of their commitments is independent of current
social morality. But there is deep and extensive disagreement over the
basis and content of any such reasons and, indeed, whether they exist
at all. Absent some means of persuasion that can bridge these
gaps . . . these principles cannot count as public reason-giving in the
United States today. 99

The above-quoted proposition evinces Utilitarianism’s basic mistake.
Doubtless, Purdy and Siegel correctly conclude that people often
disagree about what moral rubrics exist and how they apply in given
instances. Moreover, it may be impossible to know with absolute
certainty whether one actually has discerned a bona fide ethical precept
or has applied it properly to a particular dilemma. Those arguable
realities, however, cannot prove that a priori morality does not exist.
Rather, at best they reaffirm human fallibility; at worst they allow us to
camouflage our selfish preferences as genuinely moral. 100 As a result, a
“consequentialist definition of morality is both unremittingly circular
and distressingly self-indulgent.” 101
The only alternative is Deontology, the proposition that morality
exists outside of a humanly created social context of adopted preferred
outcomes. . . . If it is not a creature of human partiality, then morality
must be transcendent: that is, based on immutable, timeless,
universally applicable principles, derivable through impartial reason,
greater than the wants and desires of any given persons, groups,
organizations, or social orders. 102

Despite many theorists’ avowed preference for utilitarian solutions,
transcendent morality really is much more comfortable. By freeing
99. Purdy & Siegel, supra note 90, at 388 (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 223–
27 (1993)).
100. See Bayer, supra note 20, at 310 (“Our inability to find something does not mean that
thing is nonexistent.”). See also Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 312 (1985) (distinguishing the realist from the skeptic); Michael Moore,
Moral Reality, 1982 WISC. L. REV. 1061, 1109 (discussing factual and moral belief).
101. Bayer, supra note 20, at 296.
102. Id. at 295, 296. See also id. at 299–303 (explaining why morality is knowable only
through impartial reason). For an explanation of how human beings are able to reason with at
least sufficient accuracy, see id. at 305–11.
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morals from politics—Consequentialism’s true realm—Deontology
liberates the individual from enslavement to both her own inappropriate
preferences and the flawed predilections of others.
To offer, perhaps, too easy examples, if killing Jews because they are
Jews is immoral, such killing is not evil exclusively within liberal
cultures accepting that moral precept. It simply is evil. If husbands
act immorally by violently forcing sex on unwilling spouses, such rape
is not wicked only for societies that recognize the personhood of
wives. Rather, spousal sexual assault is morally wrong even if a
particular society believes that a husband has a societal or religious
right to ravage his wife. And, if torturing a terrorist suspect is
immoral, then no noble motive, such as saving thousands of lives,
renders torture ethical. In sum, if X is immoral, it is always immoral,
no matter how much a given person or group believes, teaches and
wants it to be otherwise. 103

The task, then, is to find a deontological theory applicable to the
Individual Mandate.
B. Professor Barnett’s Quasi-Deontology
Before explaining Kant’s deontology and how his moral theory
vindicates the Individual Mandate, this Article briefly turns to Professor
Randy Barnett’s provocative and noteworthy article, Commandeering
the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is
Unconstitutional. 104
Professor Barnett, a well-regarded scholar,
attempts in his article to replace pure Consequentialism with a
constitutional deontology derived from the phrase, “or to the people,” in
the Tenth Amendment to prove that the Individual Mandate is
unconstitutional. 105 With respect, Barnett’s reasoning is so doctrinal
that it fails to acknowledge the actual basis of his condemnation of the
Individual Mandate: that the Individual Mandate violates due process of
law, a position with which this Article emphatically disagrees. As
Professor Barnet is rightly among the most esteemed of contemporary
legal theorists, his work may well be influential on attorneys and courts
if and when the Individual Mandate’s due process bona fides are fully
litigated. Therefore, a brief rejoinder of his theory is appropriate.
Professor Barnett urges that the Individual Mandate is unlawful
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s “anti-commandeering” doctrine:
“Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative processes of the

103. Id. at 302–03 (citing Christine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with
Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 322, 328–30 (1986) (describing universalization of moral maxims)).
104. See generally Barnett, supra note 34.
105. Id.

7_BAYER

2013]

3/9/2013 1:37 PM

The Individual Mandate’s Due Process Legality

893

States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.’” 106 Clearly, “anti-commandeering” is part of the
Constitution’s basic Federalism, the essential balance of power between
the federal and state government. 107 However, as Barnett rightly notes,
the Constitution’s signpost of Federalism, the Tenth Amendment,
instructs that the remainder of governmental authority not expressly
delegated to the federal level belongs to “the States respectively, or to
the people.” 108 If, as the Tenth Amendment’s text implies, a domain of
“sovereignty” belongs exclusively to “the people,” 109 the same anticommandeering standards that constrain federal intervention into state
arenas logically forestall like congressional intrusions into individuals’
personal affairs. 110
It seems that Professor Barnett’s “anti-commandeering” approach
restates the basic, earlier discussed principle that Congress is prohibited
from unduly constraining individual liberty. His argument is that
Congress cannot take from “the people” what exclusively belongs to
“the people,” any more than Congress can take from “the States” what
exclusively belongs to “the States.” However, Barnett does not
acknowledge that because due process, and the specific fundamental
rights emanating therefrom, are what “the people” retain—what the
offices of American government at any level and of any branch cannot
violate 111— “anti-commandeering” must find its content within the Due
Process Clauses. 112
This realization is important because, lacking a due process liberty
theory, Professor Barnett’s Tenth Amendment “anti-commandeering”
argument cannot elucidate why the Individual Mandate is purportedly
unconstitutional. Granted, Professor Barnett contrasts the draft, jury
service, paying taxes, and completing census forms as examples of
constitutionally appropriate, non-commandeering governmentally
106. Id. at 622 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992)).
107. Id. at 623. For a discussion of Federalism, see supra notes 54–74 and accompanying
text.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
109. Barnett, supra note 34, at 627 (quoting U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848
(1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
110. Id. at 629.
111. See, e.g., Bayer, supra note 20, at 391–96.
112. Along similar lines, Federalism itself exists predominately to vouchsafe individual
liberty. It seems, therefore, the “anti-commandeering” concept as applied to persons is subsumed
by the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses. Because these clauses are the conclusive and ultimate
exemplars of constitutional liberty, there is nothing “anti-commandeering” under the Tenth
Amendment that due process does not already provide. Bayer, supra note 20, at 383–403.
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mandated duties. 113 Finding that these obligations are acceptable
governmental coercion, Professor Barnett concludes,
None of these duties are imposed via Congress’s power to regulate
economic behavior. Instead, all have traditionally been considered
fundamental duties that each person owes to the government by virtue
of American citizenship or residency. Each of these duties can be
considered essential to the very existence of the government, not
merely convenient to the regulation of commerce. 114

This assertion reveals the limits of the “anti-commandeering” argument.
Doubtless, Congress cannot violate due process liberty—cannot
“commandeer”—to attain, in Professor Barnett’s words, the
“convenient regulation of commerce,” or, for that matter, to foster even
an unusually urgent regulation of commerce. Due process trumps
commerce, as indeed it does any exercise of governmental power,
federal or state. 115 That being said, “Congress’s power to regulate
economic behavior” includes manipulating markets both for purely
financial purposes and to preclude, for its own sake, immoral conduct—
a principle fully settled by the Supreme Court. 116 Indeed, Congress
famously uses its commerce power to premise civil rights enforcement,
prohibiting private persons from violating the rights of other private
persons. 117 In sum, the use of economic regulation to mandate
principles of American decency is more prevalent than Professor
Barnett’s analysis allows. 118
113. Barnett, supra note 34, at 630.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text (citing cases).
116. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (citing cases).
117. See, e.g., The Federal Public Accommodations Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6
(prohibiting race, color, national origin, and religious discrimination in access to public
accommodations, such as hotels and restaurants); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17 (prohibiting race, sex, color, national origin, and religious
discrimination in employment); The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213
(prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals regarding employment and access to
public accommodations and public offices); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (forbidding a wide range of employment discrimination based on age).
118. One might respond that Professor Barnett accented “positive” rather than “negative”
responsibilities—that is, “positive duties” such as jury service, paying taxes, and conscription
require affected parties to do something they otherwise would not do. Likewise, the Individual
Mandate obliges the unwilling to purchase health insurance. By contrast, “negative” duties
mandate that persons refrain from certain behaviors they wish to perform, such as discriminating
based on race or sex. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (contrasting “a
positive duty (the [prosecution’s] duty to supply ‘information relevant to the defense’)” with “a
negative duty (the [prosecution’s] duty not to ‘use . . . perjured testimony”). But negative versus
positive essentially is a distinction without a difference because negative duties naturally take on
positive aspects and vice-versa. See id. (“After all, a plaintiff can often transform a positive into a
negative duty simply by reframing the pleadings . . . .” (citation omitted)). For instance, the
arguably negative duty not to discriminate means that bigoted employers, labor unions, workers,
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One final important observation is that Professor Barnett does not
detail the Individual Mandate actual defect from the perspective of
individual liberty, the seeming heart of “anti-commandeering.” Rather,
he appeals to the notorious “slippery slope” argument:
If a power to impose an economic mandate because it is “convenient”
to the regulation of commerce is upheld here, then Congress could
mandate any behavior so long as it is cast as part of a broad regulatory
scheme. Today it is buying government approved health insurance.
Tomorrow it could be having an annual physical or mandating what
you eat. What sounds farfetched now can change with the political
winds. 119

Of course, theorists arguing a “parade of horribles” must prove either
that the given object, here the Individual Mandate, shares the “horrible”
characteristic, or that, although not itself “horrible,” distinguishing the
problematic object is so difficult that allowing it to continue prevents
legitimately invalidating all the actually “horrible” objects within that
class. The “floodgate,” then, is an inelegant and unreliable device that
thwarts the essential principle of reasoning: elucidating with
particularity so that, within the applicable context, even highly similar
things may be differentiated and assessed individually. 120 As Justice
Frankfurter summarized, “The task of scrutinizing is a task of drawing
lines.” 121
Applying “the task of drawing lines” to one of Professor Barnett’s
specific examples of lawful commandeering, we would reject as
patently illogical the claim that if Government can draft individuals to
serve in the military, it can also conscript them into prescribed civilian

hotel managers, restaurateurs, merchants, and customers (among others) will have to hire, serve,
work alongside, deal with, and otherwise associate with persons who, absent mandating
legislation, such bigots would disregard. The positive-negative duties distinction, then, offers
little regarding the legitimacy of the Individual Mandate.
119. Barnett, supra note 34, at 634.
120. Appropriately, courts accent that “[t]his familiar parade of dreadfuls calls to mind wise
counsel: ‘Judges and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski
it to the bottom.’” Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 195 n.16
(1999) (citing ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 169 (1990)).
121. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946). Indeed, the capacity to “draw lines”—to
make meaningful, appropriate distinctions even among nearly equivalent things and ideas—is the
hallmark of legal decision-making. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073,
2083 (2012); Perry v. Perez, 132 U.S. 934, 941 (2012) (discussing relevant considerations to
enable line drawing); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 220 (1845). Writing for the Court, Justice
Holmes explained the necessity of drawing lines: “As in other cases where a broad distinction is
admitted, it ultimately becomes necessary to draw a line, and the determination of the precise
place of that line in nice cases always seems somewhat technical, but still the line must be
drawn.” Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 260 (1907).
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occupations. 122 Likewise, Professor Barnett should have explicated
why government compulsion to aid greater society by purchasing health
insurance is more akin to his example of unconstitutional laws—e.g.,
“mandating what you eat” 123—and less like his example of
constitutional laws—e.g., compulsory military service. In sum, while
the specter of Government forcing unwilling persons to divert their
money into designated commercial markets certainly seems totalitarian,
“anti-commandeering” only informs us there are limits to Congress’s
(and presumably the states’) powers. Unless one adds thorough due
process analysis, anti-commandeering lacks the concepts necessary to
discern when Government can compel obedience and when it cannot.
For an answer, I turn to Immanuel Kant’s philosophies of morality and
society to provide the deontology Professor Barnett seems to want.
C. Dignity, Morality, Duty, and the Necessity to Form Societies under
Due Process of Law
Liberal Enlightenment theory describing the “social contract”—the
ascent of humankind from the viciousness of the state of nature to the
elegance of social orders governed by law 124—is comfortably familiar.
The account of the transition from incivility to civility typically
concerns the perfectly understandable quest for security of one’s person
and one’s possessions from the ravages of those who would take
without proper justification. 125 For Immanuel Kant, by contrast, that
chronicle transcends Utilitarianism. Kant saw beyond an account of
societies, governments, and laws as simply devices for a more efficient
and peaceful coexistence among persons who unavoidably bump into
each other while vying for scarce resources to fulfill chosen pursuits.
To Kant, the social contract “does not symbolize a discretionary
arrangement of expediency, but rather a moral requisite without which
122. Needless to say, the legitimate national defense considerations regarding raising and
maintaining an effective armed forces are not inherently implicated in some governmental
scheme to enlarge the ranks of certain employment sectors. Of course, if national security truly
required increasing the number of workers in defense-sensitive private sectors, some sort of
conscription might be justifiable.
123. Assuming, for argument’s sake, such would be beyond Congress’s legislative authority.
124. “In the state of nature, where there is no controlling, official governmental authority,
persons may pursue their happiness by any means.” Bayer, supra note 20, at 361 n.418. See also
Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1835–36 (2009) (noting that
individuals in the state of nature had to form civil governments to preserve the liberty enjoyed
under natural law).
125. “[I]ndividuals fight in the state of nature, and the consequent war of all against all can
only cease when people submit to a unitary sovereign.” Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal
Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1545 (1996) (discussing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
86–90, 117–21 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651)).
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[human] dignity . . . cannot be achieved.” 126 There is an intrinsic
nobility and true beauty in Kant’s theory of society, exceeding any
derived from a consequentialist framework. 127 Kant grasped the moral
vigor required of the social contract: Government is unremittingly
devoted to due process of law. Such is the fitting source to discern the
legality vel non of the Individual Mandate. 128
1. The Rational Capacity of Each Person to Discern a
“Metaphysics of Morals”
Kant’s theories are rich and complex. However, at the risk of
précising too much, this Article offers the following encapsulation: the
bedrock upon which applicable Kantian philosophy rests is his “dignity
principle” that extols the intrinsic value of every person and premises a
system of moral duties that every person, group, organization, and
indeed government must observe. Kant urged that the innate worth of
all persons is equal, and such worth is immeasurable. 129 The
inestimable worth of human beings does not stem from the good and
decent acts that may be attributable to persons, groups, or Society.
Rather, the native value of every person simply springs from innate
“dignity,” meaning persons’ rational capacities to surpass their
sensibilities—to escape the grip of their desires and preferences and
employ reason 130 to discern and to apply a priori moral precepts. 131
126. Bayer, supra note 20, at 361.
127. “Kant’s overarching emphasis on the pursuit of moral decency accords the social contract
nobility and virtue exceeding Lockean concepts of pure security and the protection of possessions
(although those latter considerations surely are relevant to liberty).” Id.
128. Importantly, concerning his ethical theory, commentators aptly accept “Kantian ethics”
while rebuking “Kant’s ethics,” as one might embrace the paradigms of the Constitution’s
Framers, but reject many of their actual applications of their own political theory. WOOD, supra
note 95, at xii. “Kant’s ethics are his specific moral applications and discrete moral conclusions.
‘Kantian ethics, on the other hand, is an ethical theory formulated in the basic spirit of
Kant . . . .’” Bayer, supra note 20, at 347 (quoting WOOD, supra note 95, at 1). Most modern
theorists find Kant’s specific ethics steeped in racial, sex-based, and similarly appalling bigotry.
See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 95, at 7–11. By contrast, proponents of Kantian ethics adapt Kant’s
broad principles to discern both appropriate meta-theories and their applications to discrete
circumstances. Thus, mindful that strained contortions of a philosopher’s premises are
intellectually dishonest, Professor Wright reminds us of commentators’ appropriate leeway: even
if one can “make[] no claim to have arrived at the understanding that Kant intended . . . [a
justifiable] goal is to construct a useful understanding of Kant’s formula . . . rather than one that
would have met with Kant’s approval.” R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in
Themselves: The Legal Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 274 (2002).
129. WOOD, supra note 95, at 3.
130. Kant “formulated reason as the ability of humans to appreciate the implications or
‘universality’ of their actions.” John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity under the Fourth
Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 678. See also THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND
PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY 40–41, 207–08 (1992) (noting that humans’
rationality enables them to plan for and consider future consequences). Reason enables
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Due to their rational capacities, human beings are “purposive,” 132
specifically, they can identify their desires; then, through thoughtful
deliberation, determine whether to pursue those desires; and, if they
choose to do so, select among possible courses of attainment. 133
Importantly, such purposiveness is not strictly consequentialist; that is,
persons can divorce themselves from their predilections to decide
whether considerations other than their own satisfaction should dictate
their actions. Such is Kant’s pivotal concept of “practical reason”—the
“capacity to follow determinate laws given by the faculty of reason . . .
the capacity to act for reasons, rather than only on the basis of feelings,
impulses, or desires that might occur independently of reasons.” 134
Practical reason allows persons to “think as deontologists, not as
consequentialists, so that they may embrace standards applicable to all
and not simply to the self to promote the self’s own well-being.” 135 The
ability to be purposive by exercising practical reason verifies Kant’s
ultimate principle: “autonomy of the will” enables individuals to
discover the “metaphysics of morals.” 136

universality by “order[ing] concepts so as to give them the greatest possible unity combined with
the widest possible application.” Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 472, 479 (1987) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
*A644/B672 (N. Smith trans., 1965)).
131. E.g., Wright, supra note 128, at 274.
132. Peter Benson, External Freedom according to Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 569 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
133. WOOD, supra note 95, at 67.
134. Id. at 127 (referring to the concept as “practical freedom”). See also Weinrib, Kantian
Idea of Reason, supra note 130, at 481 (citing KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note
130, at *A800/B828–A802/B830) (referring to the concept as “practical reason”).
135. Bayer, supra note 20, at 349 n.335 (citing Weinrib, Kantian Idea of Reason, supra note
130, at 483). Practical reason, in turn, allows “practical judgment,” that is, “the capacity to
descend correctly from a universal principle to particular instances that conform to it.” WOOD,
supra note 95, at 152. See also Wright, supra note 128, at 278 (discussing Kant’s recognition
that the duty owed to others cannot be determined by a universal rule). “Through ‘practical
judgment’ individuals can both derive [all levels of] moral precepts . . . and discern how to apply
such precepts to discrete scenarios.” Bayer, supra note 20, at 349 n.335. For a discussion
explaining that individuals are capable of making at least reasonably correct rational, unbiased
moral judgment, see id. at 306–11.
136. Benson, supra note 132, at 575. It is true that persons often falter by deliberately acting
immorally or by misapprehending proper moral tenets and their applications. Indeed, despairing
of human frailty, Kant lamented, “[F]rom such crooked wood as man is made of, nothing
perfectly straight can be built.” IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY FROM A
COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW, reprinted in KANT ON HISTORY 17–18 (Lewis White Beck ed.,
1963) (1784). Yet, human imperfection cannot be the justification for knowingly rebuffing the
quest for morality, thus indulging every form of depravity. Our duty is to try to understand
morality and to act from that understanding.
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2. Kant’s Dignity Principle
The unique (one might even say blessed) capacity to understand
morality and to act morally ennobles what America’s Founders called
“the pursuit of happiness,” 137 and what Kant titled the “universal
principle of justice,” permitting “individuals freedom to form and
pursue their own life plans subject only to the constraint that others be
allowed a similar freedom.” 138 Professor Arthur Ripstein identified this
principle as Kant’s “innate right of humanity,” meaning, the “right to be
free, where freedom is understood in terms of independence from
another person’s choice. The power to set and pursue your own
conception of the good is Kant’s right to independence: you, rather than
any other person, are the one who determines which purposes you will
pursue.” 139
Of course, the pursuit of happiness engenders social interactions of
all kinds as we use the skills, talents, and products of others to help us
attain, in Professor Hill’s words, our “own life plan[s].” 140 Regarding
such common and integral interrelations, the capacity—not the
actuality—for rational thought giving rise to intentionally moral
behavior accords every individual “an intrinsic . . . dignity that every
other person must respect.” 141 Accordingly, persons are “ends in
themselves.” That is, they are not and may not be degenerated into
objects—may not be treated as one might use and discard equipment,
furniture, tools, or other things that have neither consciousness nor the
capacity to discern morality through reason. 142 To do otherwise would
deprive persons of that which is theirs by birthright—their very
humanity.
This human status as an “end” mandates that every person must
137. See, e.g., Bayer, supra note 20, at 335–46 (discussing the Declaration of Independence as
an expression of deontological political and moral theory).
138. HILL, supra note 130, at 54. See also ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM 288
(2009) (noting that each person has the right to use his or her means to pursue personal interests
rather than use that right to advance the interests of another person); Thomas C. Grey, Serpents
and Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 582 (1987) (explaining
that the state of external freedom is based on Kant’s universal principle of justice).
139. Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV.
1391, 1399 (2006).
140. HILL, supra note 130, at 54.
141. Bayer, supra note 20, at 350 (citing WOOD, supra note 95, at 94). “Because the capacity
for rational thought is presumed among all persons, the dignity owed to each person is not a
function of whether she has actually acted in a dignified manner—rationally, humanely and
morally.” Id. at 351 (citing LESLIE ARTHUR MULHOLLAND, KANT’S SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 94, 314
(1990) and Wright, supra note 128, at 275).
142. For a discussion of Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” second formulation, see infra notes
151–59 and accompanying text.

7_BAYER

900

3/9/2013 1:37 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

respect the dignity of every other person at all times and under all
circumstances. 143 Of course, the inverse is true: at all times, in all
circumstances, every person may demand to be treated by every other
person as an end in oneself—not due to any good works such individual
may perform, but rather due to one’s innate rational capacity. 144
Consequently, “innate dignity allows individuals to demand moral
treatment from others while simultaneously requiring those individuals
to treat others morally.” 145
3. The Categorical Imperative Formulations One and Two
From the dignity principle—the inestimable worth of each person due
to her capacity for rational thought leading to moral conduct—Kant
offered rubrics for human interaction. Because socialization is
necessary and inevitable as individuals enjoy the universal principle of
justice—that is, pursue personal happiness 146—the pivotal question
becomes: How do actors choose and pursue goals in a moral fashion,
without offending the innate dignity of those with whom they deal?
For Kant, the expedient to abide by the dignity principle is the hugely
important Categorical Imperative . . ., Kant’s “supreme principle of
morality” deduced from “pure practical reason” and expressed as “a
universal law that all rational beings can make and act upon for
themselves as free, self-determining agents whose actions are morally
good.” Kant’s [Categorical Imperative] is his understanding of . . .
how people should live in a world of others. 147
143. Wright, supra note 128, at 275. See also WOOD, supra note 95, at 94 (stating that
individual dignity must be respected and cannot conflict with respecting the dignity of another).
144. HILL, supra note 130, at 204; Bayer, supra note 20, at 350–51 (citations omitted).
145. Bayer, supra note 20, at 351. From this, Kant derived perhaps his noblest, if not his most
shocking proposition: “[H]umankind’s innate dignity is priceless, indeed greater than life itself
because ‘[t]he value of the end . . . must have existed already prior to [one’s] rational choice.’”
Id. at 351 (quoting WOOD, supra note 95, at 92). It could not be otherwise because morality is
deontological—that is, morality must be obeyed regardless of its consequences. If it is immoral
to disregard the innate dignity a human being, such objectification must be avoided at all costs,
including the cost of life. Id. at 351–52. Thus, we find inspiring regard, not reckless extremism,
for humanity’s depth in Kant’s famous declaration, “Let justice be done even if the world should
perish.” IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS,
PEACE, AND HISTORY 102 n.16 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006).
146. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 128, at 277 (explaining that there is a critical difference
between using individuals as a means and using individuals as both a means and an end). See
also infra notes 162–87, 199–203 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of a united
rational will and perfect duties, which individuals must comply with as a matter of right, and
concepts such as imperfect duties, which individuals are not, by right, entitled to assert).
147. Bayer, supra note 20, at 353–54 (quoting Fernando R. Téson, The Kantian Theory of
International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 64 (1992) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK
OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 95, 96, 105 (Harper Torchbooks ed., H.J. Paton trans., 1964)).
See also WOOD, supra note 95, at 68 (The Categorical Imperative is Kant’s “supreme principle of
morality [that] admits of no conditions or exceptions, of course, because there is nothing higher
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The first of Kant’s three variants of the Categorical Imperative states:
“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law.” 148 Put differently, Formulation
One appears to be Kant’s restatement of the Golden Rule: Do unto
others as you would have them do unto you. 149 Thus, one ought not do
X unless one believes that all other persons under like circumstances
may morally do X. However, the Golden Rule analogy cannot be taken
too far. Formulation One is not concerned with the moral substance of
any particular act. Rather, it is an essential step to freeing oneself from
the enslavement of personal preferences—isolating one’s self from
one’s desires and inclinations to concentrate on the law-like nature of
one’s action to create the possibility of acting out of pure duty. 150
As essential as it may be, Formulation One is inadequate to fulfill the
dignity principle because it lacks a means to convert “universalization
into . . . human behavior without the setting of ends.” 151 Setting ends is
a sensuous, consequentialist endeavor based on pursuing preferred
outcomes rather than on rational morality. Accordingly, “That persons
might, in perfect conscience, will some behavior as a ‘universal
maxim,’ and be prepared not only to apply that maxim to others but also
to themselves does not necessarily prevent individuals from mistaking
their personal preferences for moral principles.” 152
To answer this problem, Kant offered the celebrated Formulation
Two: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means,
but always at the same time as an end.” 153 That is, all persons at all
by reference to which conditions or exceptions could be justified”).
148. Téson, supra note 147, at 63 (quoting KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS, supra note 147, at 88). The test is “whether you could will it to be permissible (under
the moral law) for everyone to act on the maxim.” WOOD, supra note 95, at 70.
149. Bayer, supra note 20, at 354 (citing Bailey Kuklin, The Morality of Evolutionarily SelfInterested Rescues, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453, 498 (2008)).
150. George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533,
540 (1987).
151. Id. at 541.
152. Bayer, supra note 20, at 354. Put differently, “Zupancic challenges the Kantian test of
universalizability in light of its tautological nature, demonstrating that every maxim could be
construed in a manner which allows it to pass the test of universalizability.” Talia Fisher, Force
and Freedom: Can They Co-Exist?, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 387, 395 (2011) (discussing ALENKA
ZUPANCIC, ETHICS OF THE REAL: KANT, LACAN 93 (2000)). For example, Smith might honestly
believe that any person who insults another, no matter how slightly, deserves to be executed.
Although his principle certainly is immoral on its face, Smith may satisfy Formulation One of the
Categorical Imperative so long as he is willing to be executed should he forget himself and insult
someone. Formulation One eliminates hypocrisy, but cannot alone confirm the bona fides of a
proposed ethical precept.
153. Téson, supra note 147, at 64 (quoting KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
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times must be considered “ends in themselves,” thereby respecting their
individual dignity. 154 Quite sensibly, Kant’s Formulation Two accents
treating persons not “simply as a means,” which, of course, recognizes
that actors may in perfect morality attempt to pursue happiness—to
attain chosen ends—by using other persons. 155 We all use (indeed
depend on) the skills, products, resources, and talents of others
regarding every goal we pursue, grand or trivial, unique or
commonplace, complex or simple. And, of course, as we use others
they correspondingly use us for our skills, products, resources, talents,
or simply to obtain payment for services. So long as we respect the
dignity of those we use, our use is moral.
By contrast, consistent with persons’ innate dignity, “you treat
someone as a mere means whenever you treat him in a way to which he
could not possibly [rationally] consent.” 156
To avoid such
mistreatment—to be sure that when we use others we treat them as
“ends in themselves”—we must follow the principle that “persons are
not inanimate objects, meaning things that may be used purely at the
whim of and for the benefit of the user.” 157 To prevent objectification,
we must use other persons in ways that they rationally would will both
themselves and all others to be used, consistent with the dignity of
human beings.
Therefore, tactics such as coercion, deception,
intimidation, and confounding are classically unethical because, under
such conditions, persons cannot give meaningful consent. Either they
do not really know to what they are consenting or their informed
consent is the product of extortion. 158

MORALS, supra note 147, at 96).
154. Id.
155. See WOOD, supra note 95, at 87 (explaining that individuals may treat others as both
ends and means, provided that they respect others’ rights and dignity); Wright, supra note 128, at
277 (stating that individuals may use others as means, so long as they treat them also as ends).
156. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 295 (1996).
157. Bayer, supra note 20, at 355. See also Téson, supra note 147, at 64 (quoting Kant’s
recognition of intrinsic human value).
158. KORSGAARD, supra note 156, at 295. See also Bayer, supra note 20, at 355–58 (stating
that the context within which action occurs is crucial to understanding a theory because
circumstances and constraints are crucial to our understanding). It is important to recall that
using others in ways that they rationally would will themselves and all others to be used does not
necessarily mean that such use will make persons happy. The project is not consequentialist to
maximize contentment; rather the goal is moral comportment. For example, Smith, a rational
person, would will a system of due process of law allowing meaningful participation of suspects
in any criminal process brought against them. Such meaningful participation assures that if Smith
is investigated, arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced, the State at each phase respected her as
an end. Although unhappy to have been so treated, Smith can have no moral objections to the
process and its outcome, even if she is innocent. By allowing a meaningful defense, the State did
not use Smith only as a means to obtain some State goal related to her imprisonment. See Bayer,
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Based on the foregoing, Formulation Two asserts a corollary integral
to understanding the due process bona fides of the Individual Mandate.
The “duty of rightful honor” states, “Do not make yourself a mere
means for others but be at the same time an end for them.” 159 In sum,
just as one may not use another solely as a means, neither may one
deliberately sacrifice one’s dignity by allowing oneself to be used
exclusively as a means. Those who allow themselves to be literally or
figuratively enslaved act as immorally as those who do the enslaving. 160
Thus, there is an affirmative duty—a moral imperative—not to allow
oneself to be “subordinated” by “surrendering control of [personal
freedom] to others.” 161
4. The Categorical Imperative’s Third Formulation:
The “Kingdom of Ends”
The question becomes, how can one manage the ethical pursuit of
happiness in a world of others—some who may not understand their
moral duties, others who may understand but deliberately disobey?
Indeed, to assure that we and others properly understand ethical
obligations, we must accept some overarching structure legitimately
empowered to prescribe and to enforce a uniform system of laws
vouchsafing dignity among social actors. One of Kant’s greatest
contributions to liberal political theory is explaining why Government is
morally mandatory, yet when properly constituted, is not coercive upon
its citizens and guests, even though Government is the only
establishment rightfully empowered to use violence to compel
compliance with, and to punish disobedience of, the law. 162
supra note 20, at 367–68 (footnotes omitted).
159. Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 795, 811 (2003) (quoting Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in THE CAMBRIDGE
EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT—PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 392 [6:236] (Mary J.
Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797)).
160. A person must be her “own master”—that is, safeguard her “non-dependence on anyone
with whom [s]he might interact.” Id. at 812 (citing Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, supra note
159, at 394 [6:238]). Of course, to obtain products and services, we depend habitually on the
unique knowledge, experience, and expertise of others. Kant is certainly not cautioning that it is
immoral to depend on the learning of physicians, lawyers, artisans, and other professionals who,
in our markets of highly diverse division of labor, provide goods and services that we have
neither the time, nor the ability, nor the inclination to provide for ourselves. Rather, Kant’s
admonition is that our choice to obtain such products must not be coerced. This position seems to
imply that the Individual Mandate is immoral. As later discussed, however, the Individual
Mandate is not figurative bondage. To the contrary, the Individual Mandate forestalls
metaphorical enslavement. See infra notes 222–41 and accompanying text.
161. Id. (discussing Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 159, at 427 [6:278]). See
also Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1430–31 (discussing poverty).
162. See Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1417 (addressing
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To so prove, Kant stated the Categorical Imperative’s Formulation
Three, known popularly as the “Kingdom of Ends”: “Not to choose
otherwise than so that the maxims of one’s choice are at the same time
comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law.” 163 This
rather obscure phrasing describes operationalizing—putting into
practice—Formulations One and Two to found a “kingdom” of persons
who always are treated as “ends,” never “merely as means.” 164
As discussed previously,
even if personal preferences and inclinations impel otherwise, a person
must be guided instead by her unbiased rationality. If her rational
capacity understands that a particular action or standard rightfully may
be willed as a universal maxim and does not objectify persons, but
instead treats persons as ends in themselves, then she must accept the
action or standard as moral no matter how much she might like it to be
otherwise. Such moral behavior, then, may become a rational
imposition; that is, imposed against all unwilling others. So long as
the actor’s challenged behavior or standard does not offend dignity,
unwilling others must accept the impositions imposed by that moral,
albeit disliked, conduct, even if they have been used for the advantage
of the actor. 165

For that reason, there must be a process through which all can come to
an accord—the formation of a united rational will—resulting in
codification of rational impositions and implementing a system of
societal-wide enforcement. 166 Thus, departing the state of nature 167 to
Kant’s position that individual rights are meaningless unless they are accompanied by an
established system of order that subjects each individual to the same rights and obligations).
163. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 159, [4:400] (quoted in WOOD, supra note
95, at 66–67).
164. The idea of the State, then, is “a systemic union of different rational beings through
common laws.” HILL, supra note 130, at 58.
165. Bayer, supra note 20, at 359 (citing, HILL, supra note 130, at 45).
166. One prime example is a regime of property law allowing individuals to exercise
exclusive control over things even when those things are not actually held in their owner’s hands.
See infra notes 197–201 and accompanying text. True, the “requirement for omnilateral will has
been challenged on various grounds. According to Rawls, rational agents exercising collective,
rational reason are unlikely to reach an identical conclusion or form a common will. Human
individuals differ in their perspectives, life experiences, and social positions.” Fisher, supra note
152, at 395 (citing RAWLS, supra note 99, at 55). However, there can be no honest dispute that
persons must faithfully perform their moral duties. The fact that we may be incapable of actually
knowing beyond all doubt whether we understand any given aspect of a priori morality is not a
moral basis to abandon the quest, substituting raw Consequentialism for the Categorical
Imperative. Therefore, the metaphorical collective rational will must be our guide and goal lest
morality have no role, much less the lead role, in social intercourse. See supra notes 90–103 and
accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text (addressing the “social contract,”
humankind’s rise from the “state of nature” (incivility) to the elegance of social order (civility),
and Kant’s position that such social order is not merely convenient, but rather imperative).
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form a society under law is a moral imperative; it is neither a
convenience nor a matter of consent, 168 if one is to interact properly in a
world of others. 169 Accordingly, forming a society under law is not
coercive because “every rational will, equally our own and that of other
rational beings . . . in obeying the objectively valid moral law, [may]
regard[] itself as at the same time giving that law.” 170 In other words,
Society and its laws are legitimate only when consistent with the dignity
principle, the product of a universalized will—something to which all
rational persons would consent—that respects innate dignity by treating
each person as an end rather than as a mere means. 171
Because human interaction is both necessary and inevitable if we are
to pursue happiness beyond living in a cave and scavenging for food,
and because even persons of good will may be unable to agree on what
is right and just, we derive legitimate government to “‘put[] an end to
this conflict by replacing individual judgments with the authoritative
determinations of positive law.’ It is through the rational edicts of the
officers of the state that individuals know the reciprocal laws that bind
and manage interpersonal relations.” 172 The function of Government,
168. See MULHOLLAND, supra note 141, at 278–81 (discussing Kant’s view of property). See
also id. at 289–90 (discussing why Kant was not really a “social contractualist”). As Professor
Ripstein explained, Locke believed private persons could transfer their rights to the State to
enhance efficient and effective enforcement of those rights. Ripstein, Private Order and Public
Justice, supra note 139, at 1417. By contrast, “The core of Kant’s argument is that the right to
enforce rights cannot be enjoyed in the state of nature. The right that Locke imagines people
trading away is one that can only be enjoyed through the rule of law.” Id.
169. See Bayer, supra note 20, at 361 (“Kant’s pivotal enrichment of the prevailing metaphor
is that the ‘social contract’ does not symbolize a discretionary arrangement of expediency, but
rather a moral requisite without which the dignity principle cannot be achieved.”). As Professor
Wood précised, the “idea of a state” is “derived” from “the universal principle of right.” WOOD,
supra note 95, at 214–15. See also MULHOLLAND, supra note 141, at 285 (distinguishing Kant’s
postulate that people enter civil conditions because doing so allows them to acquire rights and
“not remain in a situation of conflict over the use of external objects,” with the more Hobbesian
view that people only enter into civil conditions based on self-interest); Waldron, supra note 125,
at 1546 (discussing Kant’s position that the state of nature necessarily involves human interaction
that instigates antagonism and violence among men, because without law, humankind would seek
justice in a disorderly fashion).
170. WOOD supra note 95, at 76. See also HILL, supra note 130, at 58–59 (describing Kant’s
“kingdom of ends” as a “systematic union of different rational being through common laws”).
171. For example, law rationally may require that certain professionals be licensed, including
mandating educational requirements, special examinations, and fees not imposed on other
workers. While such laws uses licensees as means in that, prior to offering their services, they
must prove their capabilities, when other types of workers need not, one could rationally mandate
that persons who would engage in highly technical, often dangerous occupations first satisfy
Society of their apparent competence to perform such work. After all, a person who without
training nonetheless chooses to engage in a highly skilled profession is so dangerous that she is
treating her clients purely as means, even if she informs them that she has insufficient education.
172. Bayer, supra note 20, at 362 (quoting Waldron, supra note 125, at 1545). See also
MURPHY, supra note 97, at 104; MULHOLLAND, supra note 141, at 304–05 (explaining Kant’s
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then, is to preserve the pursuit of happiness—Kant’s “universal
principle of justice”—in a manner consistent with Kant’s dignity
principle. Consequently, law, including “private law” such as contracts
and property,
insure[s] the exercise of external freedom [—the moral pursuit of
happiness][.] [Thus,] the law may be defined as the “set of conditions
under which the choices of each person can be united with the choices
of others under a universal law of freedom” . . . [so] that I may pursue
my ends and others, theirs—all within the framework of rules securing
our external liberty. 173

Law, therefore, is not strictly utilitarian, but instead determines if a
right—a moral duty—is applicable, whether that right has been violated
and, if so, how to bring the parties to status quo ante. Only this
conception of law promotes the universal law of freedom and the
Categorical Imperative. 174 Indeed, the surrendering of individual
theory that although individuals exist as morals outside of the State, nonetheless, due to the fact
that there are only a limited amount of resources in the world, then also “as a matter of fact,
persons are in nature subject to the conditions that lead to a state”). Rather than have a war of
discrete, individual wills—each “the judge of his or her own entitlements, doing what seems right
and good in his or her own eyes,”—we need the external control of a State. See Weinrib, Poverty
and Property, supra note 159, at 808 (citing Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 159, at
455–56 [6:312]). See also Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1414–
27 (discussing the strong role of public perspective in the reciprocal enforcement of individual
rights, and the inefficiencies of private enforcement as a unilateral mechanism).
173. See Fletcher, supra note 150, at 535 (citing 8 IMMANUEL KANT, WERKE IN ZWÖLF
BÄNDEN 337 (Suhrkamp ed., 1956) (author trans.). See also MULHOLLAND, supra note 141, at
318 (explaining how Kant justified welfare rights through reference to freedom); Weinrib,
Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 797 (discussing Kant’s portrayal of “private law,” that
of property and contract, as a system of rights that allows for the coexistence of one person’s
action with another’s freedom under a universal law). As Professor Ripstein explained, “the use
of force needs to be rendered consistent with the independence of each person from others.
Mandatory forms of social cooperation—notably the State—are justified only if they serve to
create and sustain conditions of equal freedom in which ordinary forms of social cooperation are
fully voluntary.” Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1437.
174. Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1424–27. Regarding
American law, the Supreme Court implicitly embraced this framework:
The result may appear “formalistic” in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue,
because such measures are typically the product of the era’s perceived necessity. But
the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among
sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the
temptation to concentrate power in one location [thereby endangering liberty] as an
expedient solution to the crisis of the day.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (emphasis added). See also Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 187) (concluding,
categorically, that the “Federal Government may not compel the states to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program”); Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1037 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“There can be no doubt that securing exemplary care for our nation’s veterans is a
moral imperative. But Congress and the President are in far better position [to undertake the type
of reform that appellant requests].”).
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capacity to dictate social terms in favor of a universal will explains the
legal viability of the Individual Mandate.
D. Perfect and Imperfect Duties
Of course, to forestall tyranny and to preserve the legitimacy of
Government, the same morality that limits individual behavior
constrains the State. Therefore, Government must obey Formulations
One and Two of the Categorical Imperative. 175 Not surprisingly, Kant
recognized separation of powers and due process of law as the
overarching concepts to constrain governmental acts into conformance
with the Categorical Imperative. 176 Consistent with the limits of due
process, the law may only address what Kant termed “perfect” or
“juridical” duties, rather than compelling individuals to obey
“imperfect” duties or “duties of virtue.”
Imperfect duties, or duties of virtue, encourage us to maximize “[o]ur
own perfection, and the happiness of others”; but doing so is not
175. See generally Bayer, supra note 20, at 297–99, 362–63 (discussing why groups,
organizations, and governments are subject to moral principles). There is some disagreement as
to whether Kant actually conceived the State as enforcing moral duties. Although acknowledging
that legislators are required to adhere to the Categorical Imperative so that enacted laws are
legitimate, Fletcher, supra note 150, at 552, Professor Fletcher argued that “[w]hile the prevailing
view today treats law and morality as intersecting sets of rules and rights, the Kantian view treats
the two as distinct and nonintersecting.” Id. at 534. See also id. at 542–43 (discussing the
Kantian distinctions between law and morality). In this regard, Fletcher accuses commentators of
“conflat[ing]” the two, in that Kant did not believe that a person has a “right” to enforce another
person’s moral “duty.” Id. at 543–45, 553–58.
But Professor Benson, among others, strongly disagrees, highlighting as particularly illustrative
Kant’s avowal that the moral duty to keep promises properly is enforceable under contract law.
As we know, to be legitimate, law, herein contract law, must be the product of the common will,
not simply the ad hoc wills of the particular contracting parties whose dispute happens to be
under judicial review. Benson, supra note 132, at 565–67 (discussing IMMANUEL KANT,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 101–04 (W. Hastie trans., 1881); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 215, 221–22 (J. Ladd trans., 1965)). Just as individual free will is
constrained by “practical reason”—the capacity to understand a priori morality—and must be
exercised pursuant to the Categorical Imperative, so too must the collective will—the law—be
bound. Id. at 568–77. As Benson summarized, “According to Kant, there is a metaphysics of
morals because both law and morality are grounded in one supreme principle, autonomy of the
will.” Id. at 575.
176. See Bayer, supra note 20, at 365–68 (discussing that Kant embraced the notion that the
republican state was based upon three main principles: freedom, due process, and equality; and
describing Kant’s endorsement of the separation of powers). For a discussion of how American
due process jurisprudence has tacitly embraced Kantian ethics, particularly the dignity principle,
see id. at 396–403 and infra notes 187–93 and accompanying text. Writing for the Court, the first
Justice John Marshall Harlan aptly summarized this principle nearly 110 years ago: “Even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is not an unrestricted license to act according to one’s own will. It
is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right
by others. It is, then, liberty regulated by law.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–27
(1905).
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obligatory under Kantian morality. 177 Accordingly, a “duty is imperfect
if no one is in a position to demand by right that it be complied
with.” 178 For instance, we may pursue happiness by leading selfless
lives, depriving ourselves for the sake of charity, and dedicating our
waking hours to worthy pursuits. From a consequentialist perspective,
such actions embody a good life. But, one could not rationally will an
immutable duty to ensure the happiness of others because such violates
the “duty of rightful honor.” An immutable duty to make others happy
essentially enslaves us to the personal wills of those others who, in turn,
are virtual slaves to our personal wills—simply, we would have to do
whatever is necessary to assure others’ happiness and they would have
to do likewise for us. Thus, there is no moral duty either to perfect
ourselves (such a duty would be self-enslavement) or to maximize
another’s happiness. 179 “Accordingly, we may live selfish lives,
acquiring for ourselves as much as we can with no thought of sharing so
long as . . . the pursuit of happiness as selfishness [does] not denigrate
anyone’s innate dignity.” 180
Because imperfect duties are noncompulsory and, thus, create no
rights, they cannot be coercively imposed, but rather, “are to be fulfilled
through inner rational constraint.” 181 Compelling a person to fulfill an
imperfect duty betrays her innate dignity because she is not morally
required to do what she is being forced to do. 182 Imperfect duties, then,
are not “juridical duties”—that is, are unenforceable by the rightful
coercion of Government because Society cannot compel one to do that

177. WOOD, supra note 95, at 166–67. See also KORSGAARD, supra note 156, at 20
(distinguishing between nonobligatory duties of virtue and duties of justice, which are strict
obligations that require particular actions).
178. MURPHY, supra note 97, at 34–35 (emphasis added).
179. WOOD, supra note 95, at 167. See MURPHY, supra note 97, at 35 (“[N]o one can
demand by right that I make him happy, can regard himself wronged if I fail to make him
happy.”); RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 138, at 288 (explaining how each person
has their own private right to best accommodate their purposes, and how publicizing such rights
would “systematically cancel the effects that one person’s choices had on others . . . [which]
would preclude the exercise of private freedom”). As Professor Ripstein explained,
[P]eople are required to forbear from interfering with each other . . . . You are free to
enter into cooperative arrangements with others, but nobody can compel you to
cooperate with them . . . [lest you lose your innate freedom] to set and pursue your own
conception of the good . . . . Nobody can impose an affirmative private obligation on
you as a result of their need, no matter how pressing it may be . . . . [And] [y]ou never
need to make your means or powers available to another person, even in the rare case
in which life itself is at issue.
Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1407–08.
180. Bayer, supra note 20, at 364 (footnote omitted).
181. WOOD, supra note 95, at 220.
182. MURPHY, supra note 97, at 36.
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which makes others happy. Rather, Society can only mandate that you
do not treat others merely as means—that is, you may not immorally
intrude into their “innate right of freedom.” 183
Perfect duties, by contrast, are moral imperatives that must be
fulfilled because they “spring from the very idea of external freedom: a
world in which everyone’s rights are respected is a world in which
complete external freedom is achieved.” 184 Thus, a perfect duty arises
to avoid violating the Categorical Imperative. For example, one may
not fraudulently enter into a contract because doing so treats the
promisee purely as a means; having been duped, the promisee cannot
know either the promisor’s true goals or the actual nature of the
bargain. 185
Given the non-volitional character of such duties,
individuals may demand—indeed, have a legally enforceable right—
that others perform their perfect duties. 186
E. The Guarantee of Due Process is the Constitution’s “Perfect Duty”:
Protecting the Innate Dignity of All Persons Subject to the Jurisdiction
of the United States
Perfect duties are “juridical duties”: duties of right that are proper
subjects for State enforcement. 187 Under American law, Government’s
core perfect duty—the integral obligation from which virtually all
others flow—is to formally enforce the Categorical Imperative through
due process of law. 188 Indeed, as previously discussed, the fundamental
guarantee of due process is “absolute and not merely relative. . . . [T]he
constitutional safeguard as to due process [is] at all times dominant and
controlling where the Constitution is applicable.” 189
183. WOOD, supra note 95, at 214–16. As Professor Murphy clarified, “The [person] who is
simply unhappy has no . . . claim against me. I have not violated his freedom. I have merely
exercised my right to leave him alone.” MURPHY, supra note 97, at 37.
184. KORSGAARD, supra note 156, at 21.
185. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 97, at 35 (discussing the general duty to keep promises).
186. Id. at 34–35. Logically, one could volitionally convert an imperfect duty into a perfect
duty. For example, while enhancing the happiness of others is a duty of virtue, promising to
make someone happy engenders the perfect duty to keep one’s promises. Id. at 35.
187. See id. at 35. See also id. at 36 (“Only if I unjustly limit another [person’s] freedom is
the State justified in restraining me through the coercive machinery of its force.”); WOOD, supra
note 95, at 161–62, 220 (discussing the distinction between juridical duties and ethical duties, and
noting that Kant does not regard all juridical duties as coercible).
188. Bayer, supra note 20, at 383–403 (arguing, inter alia, that, pursuant to the Framers’ intent
as inspired by the Declaration of Independence, due process under the Constitution is America’s
deontological morality enforceable by law (and the judiciary so recognizes)).
189. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350 (1909). See also United States v.
Smith, 480 F.2d 664, 668 n.9 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The guarantee of due process of law is one of the
most important to be found in the Federal Constitution or any of the amendments. . . . The
fundamental guarantee of due process is absolute and not merely relative.”).
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Even a cursory review confirms that American liberty theory has
intuited Kant’s integral thesis: due process enforces Government’s
integral obligation that all official acts of any kind uphold the inherent
dignity of those who are regulated. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
unequivocally highlighted “dignity” as the Due Process Clause’s core
meaning and impetus: “[C]hoices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 190 To offer but one prominent example, Lawrence v.
Texas held that Government has no authority to criminalize homosexual
sodomy performed in private between consenting adults. 191 The
Court’s due process analysis stressed that “[i]t suffices for us to
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon [an intimate
personal] relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.” 192 Appealing
to sentiments identical to Kant’s admonition under the Categorical
Imperative’s Formulation Two against objectifying human beings,
Lawrence declared, “The petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” 193 Thus,
regarding constitutional jurisprudence, Professor Maxine Goodman
correctly concluded that the Supreme Court “has repeatedly treated
human dignity as a value underlying, or giving meaning to, existing

190. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). See also Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (applying the substantive force of due process protection to
homosexual autonomy, and declaring that a statute criminalizing homosexual conduct was
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774
(2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952) (explaining
Government may not employ tactics ‘so offensive to human dignity’ that they ‘shoc[k] the
conscience’”)); United States v. Brantley, 342 F. App’x 762, 769 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting “the
court’s solemn obligation of ensuring that those who come before it are treated with appropriate
dignity and afforded due process”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1106 (2010); Kennedy v. Town of
Billerica, 617 F.3d 520, 540 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Chavez, 538 U.S. at 544) (holding that an
officer’s conduct, although reprehensible, fell “short of conduct that [was] ‘so brutal and so
offensive to human dignity’ that it [would give] rise to a substantive due process violation”);
Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In order to shock the conscience and
trigger a violation of substantive due process, official conduct must be outrageous and egregious
under the circumstances[.]”). See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011) (reviewing the uses of “dignity” in Supreme Court individual
rights precedents, discussing alternative definitions of dignity, and embracing the broad and
multi-faceted approach of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein); Maxine D. Goodman, Human
Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006) (examining
the role of “human dignity” in the Supreme Court’s decision-making).
191. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
192. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 578. See Bayer, supra note 20, at 400–03 (providing additional judicial examples
enforcing due process as innate dignity).
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constitutional rights and guarantees.” 194
Accordingly, while the name Immanuel Kant is unlikely to be cited,
the judiciary’s conception of due process could not comport more
agreeably with Kantian moral philosophy if the courts footnoted
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in every opinion addressing
constitutional rights. 195 Kant, therefore, provides the right paradigm to
review the Individual Mandate’s true legal concern: whether it comports
194. Goodman, supra note 189 at 743. See also Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality and Equality
of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 938 (1983)
(discussing the equality of respect model and its principal theoretical justification: that all persons
can demand to be treated with equal respect and concern as autonomous citizens). Reviewing
precedents from the late-nineteenth and early-to-middle twentieth centuries, Professor Alschuler
likewise explained, “The Court’s view was tolerant of diversity and experimentation but insisted
that law must adhere at its core to immutable principles of human dignity.” Albert W. Alschuler,
Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process,
85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 522 (1986).
195. A Westlaw search performed on July 1, 2012, revealed but forty-one state and federal
judicial citations to Kant, none by the Supreme Court, and most referencing Kant lightly in
passing. In other words, very few courts offer Kant his due. See, e.g., United States v. Barker,
771 F.2d 1362, 1368–69 (9th Cir. 1985) (referencing IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 66–67 (H.J. Paton trans., 2d ed. 1964)) (“Central to our system of
values . . . is the categorical imperative that no person may be used merely as an instrument of
social policy, that human beings are to be treated not simply as means to a social end like
deterrence, but also—and always—as ends in themselves.”). Ironically, Barker cited Kant in a
decision upholding use of criminal sentencing for deterrent purposes, a proposition seemingly in
defiance of Kant’s admonition that the only legitimate criterion for sentencing is the nature of the
felon’s crime. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 130, at 184–85; WOOD, supra note 95, at 210–12.
However, there is some commentary that Kant would allow deterrence as a generally valid goal
of criminal law, although proportionality to the given crime remains the overarching allowable
concern for any punishment. HILL, supra note 130, at 209. Any enhancement to a sentence for
the purpose of “sending a message” exceeds punishment commensurate with the actual harm of
the crime, thus using the felon purely as a means to promote the admittedly useful policy of
deterrence. See id. (“Because we find, after a careful review of the record, that the district court’s
imposition of sentence was motivated by the desire for general deterrence to the exclusion of
adequate consideration of individual factors, we vacate and remand for resentencing.”)
Among other interesting references, a California Supreme Court case rejected the defendant’s
contention that “the prosecutor ‘minimized the magnitude’ of the penalty decision by referring to
a statement by the philosopher Immanuel Kant that ‘[t]he last murderer on earth has to be
punished, the last, otherwise there is no justice.’” People v. Schmeck, 37 Cal. 4th 240, 300
(2005), abrogated on other grounds, People v. McKinnon, 52 Cal. 4th 610 (2011). In another
decision, the Middle District of Pennsylvania hoisted plaintiffs on their own Kantian petard in
Wicks v. Anderson, No. 4:09-CV-01084, 2010 WL 491712 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2010). The
plaintiffs cited Kant’s Categorical Imperative, First Formulation to opposed defendants’ motion
to dismiss their lawsuit. See id. at *11. The court, however, ruled that a rational person could not
will as a universal law that the defendants’ dismissal motion be denied because,
Plaintiffs have presented the Court with an amended complaint that, more than simply
being overrun with grammatical, typographical, and conceptual errors, has as its
gravamen an ongoing series of conclusory statements barren of any factual
content . . . . Kant’s theories for an a priori basis of morality do not aid plaintiffs’
case.
Id.

7_BAYER

912

3/9/2013 1:37 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

with the Fifth Amendment and, if enacted by a state, the Fourteenth
Amendment.
III. GOVERNMENT’S DUTY TO AID THE DESTITUTE AND ITS APPLICATION
TO THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
At first blush, under Kantian theory, Government has no authority to
assure that healthcare is generally available. Similarly, the Individual
Mandate appears beyond any legislature’s competence. After all, while
certainly a moral pursuit, any duty of benevolence to enhance the
happiness and comfort of others is imperfect under Kantian morality.
Because Government may only enforce perfect duties, the Individual
Mandate cannot be legitimized under the theory that a good and
generous society will not allow persons to go without affordable,
essential medical services. Such an argument is consequentialist and
thus does not inform whether the Individual Mandate violates the
Categorical Imperative—that is, confounds individual dignity by
compelling unwilling individuals to purchase health insurance from the
private market. 196
Therefore, the Kantian justification—thus the due process
correctness—must be that the Individual Mandate enforces some perfect
duty, in which case its impositions are legitimate. Indeed, as next
discussed, such a perfect duty exists; but it inures neither to individuals
nor to private groups. Rather, Government sustains a unique, perfect
duty to tax for the benefit of those so destitute that they cannot function
as dignified individuals; that is, those who cannot truly enjoy the
“universal principle of justice.” As Kant expressed,
[I]t follows from the nature of the state that the government is
authorized to require the wealthy to provide the means of sustenance
to those unable to provide the most necessary needs of nature for
themselves. Because their existence depends on the act of subjecting
themselves to the commonwealth for the protection and care required
in order to stay alive, they have bound themselves to contribute to the
support of their fellow-citizens, and this is the ground for the state’s
right to require them to do so. 197

As lack of access to medical treatment is comparable to poverty,
Government must tax or take other effective measures to assure that
196. The distinct possibility that those who foolishly deny themselves the protections of health
insurance but for governmental compulsion might be better off due to that such paternalism is
irrelevant because, as we know, arguments based on outcomes—Consequentialism—cannot
resolve moral dilemmas.
197. MURPHY, supra note 97, at 123–24. See also Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note
159, at 797 (discussing Kant’s view that there is a public obligation, rather than a mere freedom,
to assist the poor).
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those who refuse to obtain health insurance, regardless of the reasons,
nonetheless may enjoy minimally decent healthcare. The Individual
Mandate is equivalent to a tax, but with the unique advantage that
taxpayers may choose insurance coverage from among available options
instead of sending their money to the general governmental coffers and
taking what Government is willing to give. 198
A. Property Law and the Enslavement of Poverty
Forming a legitimate state under principles of due process is not
merely a good idea, it is a perfect duty. Persons otherwise cannot be
certain that they are interacting with others pursuant to the Categorical
Imperative. Therefore, individual wills are subject to the universal will
of collective society—the State—the duty of which is to enact and to
enforce laws comporting with individual dignity that treat all affected
individuals as ends and not mere means.
Aside from the occasional hermit, we are neither content to live in
conditions of minimal subsistence, nor satisfied with enjoying exclusive
use only of the food, clothes, and other amenities that we can actually
hold in our hands at any one time. Nor may we be so constrained if we
are to fulfill the right to pursue happiness, Kant’s “universal principle of
justice.” 199 Therefore, Society needs a regime of private law,
particularly property and contract law, to recognize abstract rights over
things. The freedom to pursue goals is empty if property rights include
ownership interests only over whatever one happens to be clutching
plus begging others to borrow whatever they happen to be holding. 200
We must be able to relinquish physical control over objects secure in
the knowledge that we have not forfeited the right to possess and to use
those objects at will. Such allows individuals to assert lawful, exclusive
claim to things not in their immediate physical possession, such as their
parked cars, bank accounts, and just about everything else over which
198. Remarkably, Kant presaged exactly how the Supreme Court would uphold legislation
such as the Individual Mandate. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text (explaining that
the Court sustained the Individual Mandate’s legality under Congress’s taxing power).
199. Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 801–11. Of course, the dignity
principle requires that “the use of a thing by one person be formally consistent with the freedom
of others, regardless of the intensity with which they want the thing or the urgency with which
they need it.” Id. at 806. Accordingly, in light of the Categorical Imperative, one cannot misuse
objects in ways that treat other persons merely as means; in particular, one may not obtain
another’s object through theft, fraud, or other immoral ways. “Take whatever you can grab” is
not the hallmark of a moral society. See NAILS, 88 LINES ABOUT 44 WOMEN (RCA Records
1982).
200. See Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1431 (“Free persons
can authorize enforceable property rights, because those rights are a way of enabling them to
exercise their respective freedom.”).
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they reasonably would exercise some sort of reserved interest. 201
Therefore, the “innate right to freedom” requires a correlative
freedom to have exclusive access to things outside of one’s immediate
grasp, so long as that right is exercised in a manner consistent with the
freedom of all others. 202 Accordingly, the State must enact a regime of
private property and contract law
to which everyone as possible owners of property implicitly
consents . . . . [J]ust as an acquirer cannot claim a right for oneself
without recognizing the similar rights of others, so others cannot assert
the rightfulness of their own acquisitions without respecting the
acquisitions of everyone else. Because no one is obligated to respect
the entitlements of others unless assured that everyone will do so, the
state’s coercive power is required to guarantee what everyone
owns. 203

The argument that abstract property rights are obligatory for the sake
of liberty reveals a fascinating truth: in a society with a rightful regime
of property and contract, poverty is an intolerable condition.
Those who have to concentrate (because of a lack of such basic needs
as food and clothing and shelter) on mere animal survival are barred
from the realization of any of their uniquely human potentials.
Destitution so profoundly impedes indigents’ innate right to freedom
that they become virtual things rather than persons. 204

Thus, impoverishment deprives persons of their due process—the
universal principle of justice—because they are “completely subject to
the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances.” 205 That is, they
are in a condition of “private dependence,” reliant on benevolence for
minimal sustenance. 206 As Tennessee Williams’ pitiful Blanche
201. Id.; RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 138, at 281.
202. Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 809. Of course, to maximize utility,
such a system would recognize various forms of simultaneous ownership allowing co-owners to
exercise discrete property interests—different forms of control—over the same object. For
instance, Smith may own a car that she leases for a year to Jones, who thereafter lends the car to
Brown for a week. The point is even when they are not in physical possession of the car, Smith,
Jones, and Brown enjoy and may expect State enforcement of their particular property rights.
203. Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 809 (emphasis added) (citing Kant,
The Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 159, at 408–09 [6:255–56], 457–58 [6:314]). Of course,
enforcement of property and contract law rests with the general will, rather than the discrete,
individual wills of the contesting parties, each “the judge of his or her own entitlements, doing
what seems right and good in his or her own eyes.” Id. at 808 (citing Kant, The Metaphysics of
Morals, supra note 159, at 455–56 [6:312])). Society through proper governmental devices,
traditionally the judiciary, resolves such disputes. Id. at 808–09.
204. MURPHY, supra note 97, at 125.
205. Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1430.
206. Id. See also Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 815–16 (describing how
the possibility of others amassing the finite amount of land and property on Earth would leave a
person with no way to exist except by leave of someone else).
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DuBois shows us, “always depend[ing] on the kindness of strangers”
wrenches the dignity from an individual, making her a supplicant in the
hope that some people will choose to follow an imperfect duty of
charity on the supplicant’s behalf. 207
Therefore, whether through the whims of unkind Fate or by their own
hubris, the law cannot compel persons to violate the “duty of rightful
honor” which, as earlier noted, states, “Do not make yourself a mere
means for others but be at the same time an end for them.” 208 The
violation occurs because mendicants are virtual slaves, dependent on
strangers for sustenance. 209 Accordingly, “dependence on private
charity is inconsistent with the united will that is required for people to
live together in a rightful condition.” 210 In sum, while one must join
Society, one could not rationally will, nor could the collective rationally
will, a social order in which one might become a vagabond 211—
“entirely subject to the discretion of others”—because such “would be
inconsistent with the freedom of those who were dependent in this
way.” 212
B. Government’s Perfect Duty to Tax for the Benefit of the Destitute
Because poverty and the threat to dignity arise within, and arguably
are the byproducts or outcomes of, a system of essential laws, the cure
must come from Government. Indeed, Kant’s conception of property
necessitates “redistribution to the poor for its own legitimacy,” 213 lest
207. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE, scene 11 (1947), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21279629/A-Streetcar-Named-Desire (last visited July 1, 2012).
208. Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 811 (quoting Kant, The Metaphysics
of Morals, supra note 159, at 392 [6:236]). See also supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text
(discussing the duty of rightful honor).
209. See RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 138, at 133–42 (discussing Kant’s
objections to slave contracts based on the postulate that rational persons cannot consent to
slavery).
210. Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1430–31 (citing
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 224 (Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
& Arnulf Zweig eds., Arnulf Zweig trans., 2002) (1785)). As Professor Ripstein later explained,
under poverty, “a person cannot use his or her own body, or even so much as occupy space,
without the permission of another. The problem is not that some particular purpose depends on
the choices of others, but that the pursuit of any purpose does.” RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND
FREEDOM, supra note 138, at 281 (emphasis added).
211. A person cannot rationally contract herself into slavery. RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND
FREEDOM, supra note 138, at 133–42.
212. Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1431.
213. Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 801.
The existence of a duty to support the poor is the necessary precondition for
establishing a state that guarantees property in a manner consistent with each person’s
innate right. Unless the duty is fulfilled, the state forfeits its legitimacy. . . . A people
that fails to fulfill its duty to support its poor cannot be regarded as joined together in a
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law illicitly becomes “a unilateral power exercised by the strong against
the weak.” 214 This redistribution principle is necessary because, under
a regime of conceptual property and given that the world and its
commodities are finite, other persons might control all the land, or all
the food, or all similar needful things. 215 Poverty, then, is not the result
of any given individual’s lawful appropriation of property—“the
prospect of impoverishment is created by the systemic legitimacy of
acquisition, rather than by the appropriative acts of any particular
acquirer.” 216 Accordingly, Society “must collectively discharge the
duty that is incidental to achieving that rightful condition.” 217 As this
potential infirmity arises from the law itself, it falls to the law to find the
answer—to allow for some mandatory redistribution so that despite
their destitution, the impoverished will not become supplicants. Indeed,
because the universal will could not rationally intend otherwise, a
governmental solution is a perfect duty. 218 Thus, it is not that the poor
are entitled to charitable sustenance or even to survival via societal
benevolence. Rather, relieving the plight of poverty is the fortuitous
outcome of Government obeying its perfect duty to prevent the law
from creating a class of beggars. 219
The solution, understandably, is some form of tax. True, any tax to
aid the poor is paid by individuals. As explained, however, a tax is paid
by the more well-off not because they have a duty to help the poor, but
because Government may impose the obligation on its constituents to
pay taxes “for its own preservation.” 220 Such “preservation” includes
maintaining governmental legitimacy by enforcing its perfect duties,
such as taxing, to restore the poor to personhood. 221
rightful condition [because that society has breached individuals’ right to pursue
happiness, the universal principle of justice].
Id. at 818.
214. Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1431.
215. Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 815–16.
216. Id. at 817.
217. Id.
218. Professor Ripstein aptly summarized the idea: “Without an institutional solution to this
problem, those who are in need could not regard themselves as authorizing the general will at
all. . . . Need is a natural problem, but dependence on the goodwill of others is a problem of
justice.” Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice, supra note 139, at 1431.
219. “The poor are supported not because they hold a right but because they are the
beneficiaries of a duty,” arising from leaving the state of nature to form a society that allows
possession of property beyond what one can physically hold in one’s hands.” Weinrib, Poverty
and Property, supra note 159, at 821.
220. Id. at 818 (quoting Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 159, at 468 [6:326]).
221. Id. Not surprisingly, some commentators dispute the Weinrib-Ripstein explanation of
Kant’s proposed governmental perfect duty to aid the poor. Professor Fisher, for example, argues
that poverty is not a form of domination that the State has a duty to end: “Market processes . . .
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C. The Due Process Legitimacy of the Individual Mandate
Kant’s example of the State’s perfect moral duty to tax for the benefit
of the poor allows reasonable extrapolations because, given its unique
and indispensable authority “to speak and act for all,” the organs of
Government “must be organized so that they do not systematically
create a condition of dependence.” 222 In other words, the duty to tax to
aid the poor is part of a larger perfect duty to assure that otherwise
proper laws do not generate vagabonds. Accordingly, so long as it is
“carried out without violating any person’s innate right of humanity,” 223
Government can regulate the healthcare market and mandate its citizens
to purchase health insurance. 224
As we now understand, the Kantian metaphor is not the perfect duty
to avoid suicide 225—the Individual Mandate is not consistent with
Kantian ethics because those who could but refuse to buy insurance are
knowingly placing their lives at risk should they suffer possibly
terminal illness or potentially lethal accidents. Since extant American
society will provide medical care for those who are uninsured, failure to
carry insurance does not per se court the risk of dying needlessly due to
refusal of medical treatment. 226 Rather, the imagery is virtual
are anonymous and impersonal in that they do not depend on or reflect the wills of particular
individuals. Individual market players cannot deliberately alter the course of market forces nor
can they effectively counteract them. The market is, in this sense, an external, objective macrocosmos.” Fisher, supra note 152, at 393 (citations omitted). See also Aditi Bagchi, Distributive
Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 123 (2008) (arguing that the duty is imperfect
rather than perfect).
Professor Fisher’s description of the market forces is true enough, but this system of
“‘masterless slavery,’” Fisher, supra note 152, at 394 n.33 (quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 1186 (1978)), exists because Government has a perfect duty to promulgate laws
recognizing and enforcing the private right to assert exclusive use and control over objects not
physically held by the owners. Id. Basic deontology demonstrates that individuals cannot avoid
their ethical duties by outsourcing immoral behavior to entities they create, and then claim they
are not culpable because those entities somehow have developed beyond the control of the very
participants who benefit from the entities’ immoral conduct. Bayer, supra note 20, at 297–99.
Because it has a non-delegable duty to design and implement a private property system consistent
with individual dignity, Government has a concurrent duty to correct the immoral abuses of the
system it creates. As our Founders explained in the Declaration of Independence, such humanly
created instruments, particularly governments, must self-correct their illegitimate behavior or
suffer correction (even to the point of revolution) by the unified will of the People. Id. at 335–42.
222. RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 138, at 272.
223. Id. at 285.
224. See id. (noting generally the possibility of legitimate Government-mandated healthcare
regulations but not discussing any particular mechanisms).
225. For Kant, suicide based on despondency is an immoral act as an affront to the humanity
of one’s own person. See HILL, supra note 130, at 51, 203.
226. For instance, hospitals that provide emergency treatment may not refuse to treat
uninsured persons who otherwise are unable to pay for medical services. See Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
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enslavement. It seems irrefutable that almost certainly, persons without
health insurance someday will need expensive medical care, will in fact
want such care, but will be unable to pay out-of-pocket. 227 Individuals’
decisions to seek healthcare despite their inability to pay is rational
because, like starvation, homelessness, and nakedness, sickness can
thwart the ability to pursue happiness. Thus, the needy unwell will
render themselves supplicants to the largess of charity to regain health
enough to be independent. 228 Because Government cannot employ the
collective rational will to enact property and other private law that
would financially enslave some of its constituents, its perfect duty to tax
for the benefit of the poor likewise allows a taxation system to benefit
those who need but cannot afford medical services.
For Kantian purposes, the Individual Mandate is a tax designed to
assure that there will be no beggars in the healthcare market. 229 Indeed,
the tax is nicer than simply putting money into the public treasury
because each taxpayer enjoys some discretion to choose among
available insurance coverage options that meet the Affordable Care
Act’s minima. So long as it otherwise does not violate the Categorical
Imperative, such as imposing a tax so oppressive that it is
confiscatory, 230 the Individual Mandate comports with Kantian ethics
and, therefore, satisfies the Constitution’s “fundamental fairness”
standard promulgated in its guarantee of liberty under the due process
clauses.
One might respond that Medicaid already protects the ill who are too
poor to obtain private health insurance, and thus the destitute are
227. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2610 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Unlike the market
for almost any other product or service, the market for medical care is one in which all
individuals inevitably participate. . . . When individuals make those visits, they face another
reality of the current market for medical care: its high cost.”).
228. Of course, these arguments in no manner imply that persons with severe chronic illnesses
invariably are unable to be independent. Still, for the ill, minimally adequate healthcare is the
route to enable their right to pursue happiness by overcoming pain, fatigue, or other medically
related disabilities.
229. It does not matter that Government might have instituted some other form of tax such as
a “single-payer” system. Kant’s project was not to devise one or a number of detailed actual
systems. In that regard, “The Kantian argument is formal and procedural rather than substantive.”
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 138, at 284. Rather, Kantian ethics requires that
Government satisfy its duties in compliance with the Categorical Imperative. If there is more
than one way to do so, Government is free to choose. Id. at 284–85.
230. See Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 400 (1933) (noting that a tax being confiscatory in
nature is a consideration in whether particular tax legislation is inconsistent with the fundamental
conceptions of justice that are embodied under due process). See also supra note 86 and
accompanying text (discussing a restriction on taxes imposed by the due process clause that they
not be arbitrary, unequal, punitive, or excessive).
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covered without imposing a burden on others to purchase their own
private coverage or pay a tax penalty. But, the Individual Mandate’s
due process validity does not derive only from aiding the extant poor.
Rather, and very importantly, the Individual Mandate precludes those
who are better-off from violating the Categorical Imperative, Second
Formulation’s earlier accented corollary, “the duty of rightful honor.”
As previously discussed, the perfect duty states, “Do not make yourself
a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.” 231
Therefore, one may not volitionally adopt a slave-like status by
allowing oneself to be used exclusively as a means. 232
Certainly, the vast majority of uninsured adults know three things: (1)
almost inevitably, due to accident or illness, they will need significant,
expensive healthcare that they will be unable to afford; (2) very likely
the onset of such illness or accident will come unexpectedly with little if
any warning; and (3) rather than die or suffer by foregoing medical
treatment, they will accept public or private charity. By deliberately
refusing available health insurance, such persons consciously place
themselves at manifest risk of becoming supplicants. Because it is
unlikely that they will simply drop dead—thus foregoing intense
medical intervention—the uninsured have no liberty interest in courting
awaiting beggardom. 233 In fact, the very act of refusing health
insurance is so irresponsible that such contrarians compromise their
own dignity even when healthy and robust. 234
Moreover, an interesting, even startling corollary is that in additional
to uninsured individuals, the Individual Mandate protects another class
of persons from the enslavement of poverty: the health insurance
industry itself. The Supreme Court controversially but quite rightly has
recognized the legal personhood of corporations of all types, business
and otherwise. 235 Indeed, the constitutional protections accorded to
231. Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 159, at 811 (quoting Kant, The Metaphysics
of Morals, supra note 159, at 392 [6:236]).
232. See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text (discussing Formulation Two and the
“duty of rightful honor”).
233. Going without insurance is hardly comparable to morally sustainable self-jeopardy, such
as risking one’s life to save the lives of others. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 130, at 55–56 (stating
that Kant would not oppose a researcher testing an experimental drug on herself if less drastic
means are unavailing).
234. As mentioned previously, suicide likewise is immoral. See supra note 225 and
accompanying text. Therefore, those who would otherwise refuse cannot avoid their duty to
acquire health insurance by earnestly promising to kill themselves through refusing medical
treatment before accepting charity in the form of free medical care. The reason is not that they
are highly unlikely to keep that promise, although such probably is the case. Rather, no less than
begging, suicide violates the perfect duty to respect one’s own dignity.
235. See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010) (citing
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firms do not emanate from any notion of “property,” but rather, from
their status as effective persons under law. 236
Accordingly,
corporations possess virtually the full panoply of constitutional
rights. 237
It does not matter whether firms hold their own innate personhood or
become imbued vicariously with the dignity of the human beings who
found, administer, and use them. The reality is that individuals must
form and rely on corporations to fulfill virtually every type of project,
personal or commercial. Corporations have become indispensable
devices through which we conduct all manner of dealings.
Accordingly, by whatever theory, corporations must be respected as
persons for two reasons. First, being persons, they must obey the same
immutable moral duties that govern human beings. We, therefore, can
hold corporations accountable for both their own acts and for the
immoral acts of those who use them. In that way, persons cannot
escape their ethical obligations by acting through intermediaries such as
corporations. 238 Second, absent such personhood, corporations cannot
cases). See also Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 407 n.6 (3d
Cir. 2005) (noting that corporations have standing to bring constitutional claims on their own
behalf); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1057 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (similar);
N.E. Ga. Radiological Assocs. v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1982) (asserting that a
corporation is a “person” with due process rights).
Congress has also acknowledged, in the “Dictionary Act,” the personhood of artificial entities:
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . .
the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, [] joint stock companies, [and] individuals . . . .” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
236. The former standard that any due process rights inuring to corporations stem from
property interests, Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), “is an artificial mode of
analysis, untenable under decisions of this Court.” First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 779 (1978) (holding that corporations are persons entitled to due process of law).
237. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (ruling that corporations enjoy First Amendment
speech rights); Allied-Signal Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 772–73 (1992)
(explaining that taxation of corporations must comport with due process); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (finding that due process limits states’
exercise of “long arm” jurisdiction over foreign corporations); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (affording corporations Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy in a case discussing whether an acquittal rather than a dismissal may be
appealed); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) (holding that
corporations are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection); Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar,
273 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that corporations are persons under 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
238. See Bayer, supra note 20, at 297–99 (arguing that due process principles must be applied
not only to the individual, but also to created entities so as to prevent individuals from escaping
their moral duties simply by forming groups authorized to execute unethical acts). It is true that
Society could simply enact laws imposing such duties; but, reasonable people would ask why
such laws are consistent with perfect duties as regulating corporations directly affect the
individuals who use and run those entities. The answer must be that corporations should be
treated as persons under the law.
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protect the dignity of those with whom they come in contact. For
example, if corporations have no rights, then persons who entrust to
them highly personal information, such as medical records or financial
statements, can expect such material to be public knowledge accessible
for the asking. The only way to justify the theory that persons maintain
their rights when they willingly convey private things to corporations is
by imbuing corporations with personhood, either their own or that of the
individuals who use the corporations. 239
As earlier discussed, the Affordable Care Act, inter alia, requires
insurance carriers to insure all persons, including those with preexisting
conditions and those practicing dubious habits likely to endanger their
health. Indeed, companies must cover such conditions from the time
individuals enroll. Moreover, with very limited exceptions, insurance
carriers may not charge higher premiums, deductibles, copayments, and
other fees based on preexisting conditions or personal behaviors. 240
Such requirements almost certainly would bankrupt most, if not all,
private insurance firms. Thus, the Affordable Care Act itself would
impoverish the very class of corporations it regulates, requiring them
either to fold or to become supplicants in bankruptcy. Intuitively
complying with Kantian principles to prevent the quasi-enslavement of
those businesses—to respect their dignity as legal persons—Congress
enacted the Individual Mandate, thereby infusing insurance carriers with
the cash needed for Affordable Care Act compliance. 241
Importantly, contrary to the Individual Mandate’s critics, the same
cannot be said for a government command to buy, say, broccoli, even if
the domestic broccoli market were on the brink of collapse. Market
failure based on traditional notions of competition does not implicate
the issues raised by the Individual Mandate. Property and contract law
generally do not and need not warrant the success of any given business
or line of enterprise. In theory at least, firms and markets thrive or fail
on their merits, which is all that morally responsible ventures
239. To cite a similar instance, the judiciary has held that corporations contribute to the
dissemination of information, opinions, perspectives, and ideas. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 902 (citing Bellotti, 425 U.S. at 784) (opining that corporate speech adds to the national
political debate). To deny corporations civil rights, such as speech, stifles people’s ability to
communicate through corporate means, a terrible infringement in our modern age of mass
communications. Accordingly, in the ambit of free speech, the “legislature is constitutionally
disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who
may address a public issue.” Bellotti, 425 U.S. at 784–85; accord Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
899.
240. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
241. Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (discussing the
Act’s expected effects on the U.S. economy and interstate commerce, including adding millions
of new customers to the healthcare market and increasing supply and demand of medical care).
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reasonably can ask. But, when Government’s direct regulation causes
the class of legitimate business to collapse, as the Affordable Care Act
would absent the Individual Mandate, one may apply the Kantian tax
principle. 242
Moreover, Congress may not exercise the Kantian tax concept to
safeguard even significant commercial markets because unlike
acquiring health insurance, consumers who now refuse to buy cars and
broccoli will not suddenly need those products to survive, but be unable
to purchase them absent insurance. Thus, the failure of such markets
will not create a class of supplicants. 243
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the formulations emanating from the Categorical
Imperative, the Individual Mandate is a rational means to fulfill
Government’s unique moral obligation that its legal system not create
mendicants—persons who must beg to obtain the sustenance without
which they cannot function as independent members of society. In that
way, Kantian ethics, which informs American due process
jurisprudence, demonstrates that the Individual Mandate complies with
integral liberty.

242. I say “legitimate business” because certainly government regulation might place national
business at some competitive disadvantage when competing with similar but unregulated, lesserregulated, or subsidized foreign enterprises. Insofar as such domestic regulations assure safe and
effective products and marketing, however, the regulated concerns have no complaint that
Government is exceeding its legal and moral authority. The reason is, bound by individual
morality, business violates a perfect duty by marketing unsafe products or by dishonestly
informing the public about its products. Properly enforced regulations, therefore, compel
legitimacy by requiring firms to observe their perfect duties.
243. Possibly, persons whose livelihood depended on markets collapsed through government
intervention will face poverty. If unable to find new sources of income, they will have access to
social welfare programs designed, theoretically at least, to enable them to regain societal
independence. Similarly, the businesses themselves may access bankruptcy laws. Thereunder,
businesses that fail—fall into poverty—are accorded the opportunity to reformulate, often with a
large degree of debt forgiveness. See FCC v. NextWave Personal Commc’ns, Inc. 537 U.S. 293,
301 (2003). See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (citing Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)) (“[Bankruptcy law] is [intended] to give debtors ‘a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt.’”). In that way, suitably consistent with the Kantian tax
principle, destitute corporations are salvaged by the Government that enacted the framework of
property, contract, and business law under which those businesses floundered.

